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The Supreme Court and State
Regulation of the Legal
Profession
By ROBERT J. MARTINEAU*
Introduction
For many decades the legal profession was thought to be ex-
clusively under the control of the states and virtually immune from
supervision by the United States Supreme Court. Since 1945 more
and more issues involving the legal profession have been brought
to that Court; and, since 1957, it has found various federal consti-
tutional and statutory provisions violated by states' efforts to con-
trol the practice of law. Each individual decision or group of deci-
sions has prompted substantial comment and criticism by legal
scholars. To date, however, there has been no attempt to discover
if there are any common themes running through the Supreme
Court decisions relating to the legal profession which would reveal
the Court's present view and how it is likely to deal with other
matters concerning the legal profession that may be brought before
it in the future. The purpose of this article is to provide such a
comprehensive treatment for consideration by state supreme
courts, state regulatory agencies, state and local bar associations,
and attorneys and prospective attorneys, all of whom are directly
affected by the Supreme Court's actions.
The decisions of the Supreme Court on the legal profession
can be classified in several different ways. The most obvious is
chronological. The year 1957 marked the turning point in the Su-
preme Court's relationship with regulation of the bar. Prior to that
time, the Court had consistently refused to find any federal ques-
* B.S., 1956, College of the Holy Cross; J.D., 1959, University of Chicago. Currently
Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Cincinnati College of Law. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Diane Kappeler, Wayne Grodidier and Joan Roddy,
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tion or constitutional violations in the activities of state courts, leg-
islatures or bar groups in regulating the bar. In 1957, however, the
Court began to scrutinize very critically these types of activities,
finding violations of equal protection, procedural due process, First
Amendment and other fundamental rights, as well as federal
statutes.
Another method of classification is by subject matter. A review
of the cases shows that they deal with three main ar-
eas-admission, discipline and practice. These classifications are
not mutually exclusive and thus there is some overlap. Nonethe-
less, these groupings serve as a basis for analyzing the decisions
and will be used in this article.
I. The Historical Perspective
Any review of the Supreme Court's relationship with the legal
profession must begin with the development of the regulation of
the bar both in England and the United States. The English sys-
tem is to some degree distinctive because of the division of its legal
profession into barristers and solicitors. There were differences as
to education, admission and discipline. Regulations as to each were
made by the judges, the Inns of Court and Parliament.'
1. Roscoe Pound describes the difference in the seventeenth century in the following
terms: "The judges, the Inns of Court, and Parliament began to make distinct regulations
for attorneys and for barristers.
"As to barristers, the judges had long before delegated to or perhaps more truly acqui-
esced in leaving to the Inns of Court their power of admitting to practice in the courts.
Those whom the Benchers had called to the bar of the Inn were received by the courts as
qualified practitioners. On the other hand, attorneys were admitted directly by the court in
which they sought to practice. With respect to discipline, the barrister was directly under
the control of the Inn which had called him to the bar. He could be disbarred either by the
Benchers of his Inn or by the judges. But the judges seldom acted and Parliament made no
attempt to supersede or supplement the control by the Inns of Court.
"In contrast, the attorneys were strictly regulated both by Parliament and by the
judges. Medieval statutes gave the courts power both to control and to admit them. All
through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this control became increasingly strict. Or-
ders of court were made as to admission of attorneys, requiring examination, and as to con-
duct and discipline. The courts were very severe in enforcing these orders. In 1605 a statute
regulated the rendering of accounts to clients, provided penalties for fraud and negligence,
and sought to eliminate unqualified practitioners.
"As to personnel, the expense of education at the Inns of Court led to a marked differ-
ence. The barristers were younger sons of the nobility or gentry, or were men of indepen-
dent means. The attorneys were recruited from clerks. Indeed, the nature of their work was
largely clerical and in their mode of appointment as well as the requirements of their call-
ing, their contacts were with the clerical staff of the courts, as the contacts of the barristers
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In the American colonies regulation of the bar paralleled the
establishment of organized judicial systems. After efforts to get
along without attorneys failed, three different systems of regula-
tion had developed by the time of the Revolution. Four colonies
followed the English system, with each court admitting attorneys
to practice before it. Four other colonies adhered to a rule of com-
ity where an attorney admitted in one court was authorized to
practice before any other court. Five colonies had a centralized ad-
mission system, with control exercised by the colony's highest
court or the royal governor.2 A detailed examination of the situa-
tion in each of the colonies shows that each system had its origin
in or was recognized by legislative acts.$ The organized bar
originated during this era also, particularly in New England.'
After the Revolution, there was a gradual elimination, by leg-
islative act, of formal requirements for admission to the bar. By
1860, only nine of thirty-nine states or territories had such require-
ments.5 A revival occurred after 1870, with bar associations leading
the way in seeking to impose educational and other requirements
on admission to the bar.' To some degree this effort brought about
a contest between the courts and the legislatures for control over
the bar. The courts gained ultimate authority, yet recognized a le-
were with the judges.
"At first the King's Bench and the Common Pleas had each its own roll of attorneys.
The Exchequer had a staff of clerks who acted as attorneys. But more and more the same
person came to act as attorney in all the common-law courts. An order of 1564 sought to
prevent this. It was not effective, however, and the attorneys came to be competent to prac-
tice in each common-law court. Also, because of their being regarded more or less as part of
the clerical staff of the court, they were required to be in constant attendance and were
exempt from suit except in their own court on the roll of which they were carried. The
orders of court at the time required that one who sought admission as an attorney must
have served five years as a 'common solicitor,' i.e., an agent not admitted as an attorney, or
a clerk to a judge, serjeant, barrister or attorney. The practice came to be to prepare by
serving as an attorney's clerk.
"In the seventeenth century the term 'barrister' came into general use in place of the
older 'apprentice at law.' It is first found in connection with utter (i.e., outer) barristers.
Plowden insisted on being called a 'learned apprentice of the law' even after he became a
serjeant in 1558." R. PoUND, THE LAwYER FRo'M ANTrQUrrY TO MODERN TdiES 99-101
(1953)(footnotes omitted). See also C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMCAN BAR 146-56
(1966).
2. R. PouND, supra note 1, at 145-46.
3. Id. at 147-56.
4. Id. at 163-73.
5. Id. at 227-28.
6. Id. at 273-78.
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gitimate role for the legislatures. In each state it is the supreme
court, with or without the legislative approval, that dictates the
standards for education, admission and discipline of attorneys.7
The federal courts require a separate admission to practice in
addition to that imposed by the states, though admission in the
federal courts has always been based upon admission in a state
court.8 The federal courts do not have their own bar examinations,
boards of law examiners, disciplinary agencies, or standards of le-
gal ethics. However, the federal courts do not automatically disbar
an attorney who has been disbarred by a state court. Instead, they
decide for themselves if the conduct merits this extreme penalty.9
II. The Cases
A. Admission
While the states have always controlled admission to their own
bars, the formal requirements which now exist have not always
been prevalent. As previously noted, in 1860 only nine of thirty-
nine states or territories had formal requirements for admission to
the bar. Some states had constitutional provisions or statutes per-
mitting virtually any person to practice law.10 This situation
changed dramatically after 1870, and now every state has substan-
tial requirements for admission to its bar. Almost all states require
graduation from an American Bar Association accredited law
school, passage of a bar examination, and good moral character.,
Many states also have a residency requirement. 2
Because of the lack of state-imposed requirements, it is not
surprising that the first case challenging a denial of admission by a
state was not decided by the Supreme Court until 1872. In
7. L. PATrTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 281, 286-89 (1971).
8. Id. at 300-04; C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 242-43; Note, Attorneys: Interstate and
Federal Practice, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1711, 1724 (1967). Federal courts may be in the process
of imposing additional qualifications. Spears, Federal Court Admission Standards-A 45
Year Success Story, 83 F.R.D. 235 (1979).
9. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
10. R. PoUND, supra note 1, at 225-26.
11. RuLEs FOR AnMISSION TO THE BAR (West 1979).
12. Id. See also Gordon v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397
N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979)(residency requirement held to violate the privileges
and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution).
[Vol. 8:199
Bradwell v. Illinois, s the question before the Court was whether
the Illinois Supreme Court could, consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment, refuse to admit a woman to practice solely because of
her sex. Under an Illinois statute, a person could practice law in
that state only by obtaining a license issued by two justices of the
Illinois Supreme Court. The only eligibility requirement was that
the applicant obtain a certificate of good moral character from a
county court. The Illinois Supreme Court, even though it agreed
that she possessed all the necessary qualifications, refused to issue
a license to Mrs. Myra Bradwell. 14
The United States Supreme Court considered the case, al-
though the Illinois Supreme Court did not reach the federal consti-
tutional issues raised by Mrs. Bradwell.15 In an opinion by Justice
Miller, the Court held that Mrs. Bradwell was a citizen of Illinois
and that the privileges and immunities clause of the United States
Constitution did not protect a citizen against the actions of the
state of which the citizen is a resident. The Court also stated that
although the Fourteenth Amendment does protect a person from
the deprivation by a state of the privileges and immunities flowing
from United States citizenship,
the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not
one of them .... [Tihe right to control and regulate the granting
of license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those
powers which are not transferred for its protection to the Federal
government, and its exercise is in no manner governed or con-
trolled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking
13. 83 U.s. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
14. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (1869). The court stated that although the statute gov-
erning admission to the bar did not expressly restrict it in determining who could be admit-
ted, the court felt it was bound by two limitations: (1) terms of admission should promote
the administration of justice, and (2) no persons or class of persons should be admitted who
were not intended by the legislature to be admitted even though their exclusion was not
expressly prohibited by statute. Relying on the historical fact that women attorneys were
both unknown in England at the time Illinois became a state and unknown in Illinois at the
time the legislature authorized the supreme court to admit attorneys, the court said that it
was not a judicial function, but a legislative one, to change the law in this regard. The court
concluded by stating- "If the legislature shall choose to remove the existing barriers, and
authorize us to issue licenses equally to men and women, we shall cheerfully obey, trusting
to the good sense and sound judgment of women themselves, to seek those departments of
the practice in which they can labor without reasonable objection." Id. at 542. The Illinois
Supreme Court later changed its view by claiming for itself the power to control admission
to practice. In re Day, 181 IMI. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899). Women were admitted to practice in
Illinois in 1872 by virtue of a legislative act. Schuchardt v. People, 99 Il1. 501 (1881).
15. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 541 (1869).
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such license.16
A concurring opinion pointed to the differences between the male
and female which proved conclusively that the right to practice law
could not be claimed as a fundamental privilege or immunity.17
The concurring Justices concluded that it was the duty of the leg-
islature to determine who should practice law.
The next case to come before the Court, In re Lockwood,",
also involved a woman seeking admission to practice. Belva Lock-
wood, an experienced attorney, was denied admission to practice in
Virginia despite a statute which authorized admission to the bar of
any person who had been admitted to the bar of another state."
Following Bradwell, the Court held that admission to practice law
was not a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States.
Fifty-one years elapsed before the Supreme Court again had
to face a bar admission problem. In re Summers0 resulted from a
denial by the Illinois Supreme Court of the admission of an appli-
cant because he was a conscientious objector to the use of force for
any purpose. Resolving a threshold jurisdictional issue, the Court
concluded that
a claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state and a
denial of that right is a controversy. When the claim is made in a
state court and a denial of the right is made by judicial order, it is
a case which may be reviewed under article m1 of the Constitu-
tion when federal questions are raised and proper steps taken to
that end, in this Court.21
As to the merits, the majority viewed Summers' pacifist belief
16. 83 U.S. at 139.
17. "IT]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must
be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional
cases." Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., joined by Field & Swayne, JJ., concurring). Justice Mar-
shall quoted these remarks in a footnote in a concurring opinion in Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 344 (1977), commenting that the Bradwell case has been "long since discred-
ited." Chase, C.J., dissented without opinion.
18. 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
19. The Court noted that Ms. Lockwood was a member of the bar of the United States
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and of several other states,
but commented that there was nothing in the record to indicate of what state she was a
citizen. Id. at 116-17.
20. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
21. Id. at 568-69. Illinois had taken the position that its supreme court, in acting on
bar applications, was performing a ministerial rather than a judicial act. Id. at 565-66.
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as precluding him from serving in the Illinois militia even though
such service was required by the Illinois Constitution. The Court,
for the first time and without discussion, acknowledged that the
Fourteenth Amendment did apply to bar admission questions. The
Court examined the cases which upheld the power of the federal
government to deny citizenship to persons who would not agree to
pledge military service and which did not recognize a constitution-
ally mandated religious exception to that power,22 and decided
that Illinois had equal power to deny admission to practice.23
The first case in which the Supreme Court reversed a denial of
admission occurred in 1957. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examin-
ers,24 the Court found that New Mexico had denied Schware due
process by refusing him permission to take the bar examination. It
held that his membership in the Communist Party, his use of ali-
ases and his arrest (but no conviction) record, all of which occurred
over twenty years prior to the Court's decision, did not rationally
justify a finding of lack of good moral character upon which the
denial was based. Justice Black, writing for the majority, further
held that a state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law
in a manner or for reasons that violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; that a state can require qualifications of good moral charac-
ter or proficiency in the law, but any qualification must bear a ra-
tional relationship to the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law; and that a state cannot, in applying permissible standards, ex-
clude applicants when there is no basis for finding that a standard
is not met or when the action is invidiously discriminatory. 5
The Court found the latter principle to have been violated by
22. See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
23. 325 U.S. at 573. The Court held that "[i]t is impossible for us to conclude that the
insistence of Illinois that an officer who is charged with the administration of justice must
take an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois and Illinois' interpretation of that oath
to require a willingness to perform military service violates the principles of religious free-
dom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state action, when a like interpreta-
tion of a similar oath as to the Federal Constitution bars an alien from national citizenship."
Id. Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rut-
ledge concurred. He argued that Illinois was using a test oath to bar a person from a profes-
sion and this was unconstitutional, citing the dissents in the denial of citizenship cases. Id.
at 576-78.
24. 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Black, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Frankfurter, J.,
and Harlan, J., joined by Clark, J., dissented.
25. Id. at 238-39.
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New Mexico, and on that basis reversed.26 It found that New Mex-
ico was unjustified in taking Communist Party membership in the
1930's as conclusive evidence of lack of good character.
On the same day the Court handed down the Schware deci-
sion, it also decided the first of a series of cases involving appli-
cants' refusal to answer questions about membership in various
types of organizations, usually those identified as Communist. In
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California27 (Konigsberg I), the appli-
cant was denied admission to the bar because he refused, in hear-
ings before the State Committee of Bar Examiners, to answer
questions concerning possible Communist Party membership. The
formal reasons for the denial were that he failed to show good
moral character and failed to show that he did not advocate the
overthrow of the federal or state governments by force or other
unconstitutional means. The Supreme Court, in another opinion
by Justice Black, first stated that the issue was not whether Cali-
fornia could constitutionally deny admission solely on an appli-
cant's refusal to answer questions concerning political associations;
rather, the question was whether the evidence in the record sup-
ported any reasonable doubts as to Konigsberg's good character or
loyalty. The Court concluded that it did not, finding that Commu-
nist Party membership in 1941 was not sufficient evidence of lack
of good moral character, nor was it evidence of advocacy of the
violent overthrow of the federal or state government. Konigsberg
had, in fact, expressly stated to the Committee his opposition to
violent overthrow of government. The Court reaffirmed "the im-
portance of leaving States free to select their own bars," but stated
that "it is equally important that the State not exercise this power
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such way as to
impinge on the freedom of political expression or association." 8 It
also restated its central position that "past membership in the
Communist Party, if true, without anything more, is not an ade-
quate basis for concluding that [an applicant] is disloyal or a per-
son of bad character. '29
26. The only disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions was that,
while the majority was of the view that New Mexico had based its action on the three fac-
tors noted above, the dissenting justices read the record to indicate that the controlling
element for the New Mexico decision was the prior communist activity.
27. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
28. Id. at 273.
29. Id. Three justices dissented on jurisdictional grounds. Justices Harlan and Clark
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The decision did not, however, resolve the matter. On remand,
Konigsberg was again refused admission, thus requiring the Court
to consider the matter a second time in Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California"0 (Konigsberg II). This time, California expressly as-
serted that a ground for denial of admission was the refusal to an-
swer questions concerning Communist affiliation. Justice Harlan,
who had dissented in Konigsberg I, wrote the majority opinion, de-
ciding against Konigsberg. With four justices dissenting, the Court
held that "the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbi-
trary state action does not forbid a State from denying admission
to a bar applicant so long as he refuses to provide unprivileged
answers to questions having a substantial relevance to his qualifi-
cations."3 1 The Court noted that the applicant would have to be
given due warning of the consequences of his refusal to answer rel-
evant questions, 2 but found that he had been given the necessary
warning in this case.33 The Court also concluded that the applicant
did not have a privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to re-
fuse to answer questions concerning Communist Party
membership.
On the same day as the Konigsberg II decision, the Court, in
another opinion by Justice Harlan, also decided In re Anastaplo.5 4
Anastaplo had been denied admission to the Illinois bar also be-
cause of a refusal to answer questions concerning Communist
Party membership. On the basis of Konigsberg II, the Court af-
firmed, again with four justices dissenting. Justice Harlan stated
that Konigsberg II settled two basic issues: first, that it is
not constitutionally impermissible for a State legislatively, or
through court-made regulation as here and in Konigsberg, to
adopt a rule that an applicant will not be admitted to the practice
of law if, and so long as, by refusing to answer material questions,
he obstructs a bar examining committee in its proper functions of
interrogating and cross-examining him upon his qualifications;
[and secondly that] the State's interest in enforcing such a rule as
applied to refusals to answer questions about membership in the
contended that the issue was whether a state could deny bar admission to those who refuse
to answer questions about fitness for the bar.
30. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
31. Id. at 44.
32. Id. at 46.
33. Id. at 49.
34. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of
speech and association, and hence that such state action does not
offend the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
The Court noted that here there was no independent evidence that
Anastaplo, unlike Konigsberg, may have been a member of the
Communist Party. Justice Harlan concluded that "it is of no con-
stitutional significance whether the State's interrogation of an ap-
plicant on matters relevant to these qualifications [for the bar] is
prompted by information which it already has about him from
other sources, or arises merely from a good faith belief in the need
for exploratory or testing questioning of the applicant."3 6 The
Court did find two issues here that were not in Konigsberg: it
questioned whether adequate warning was given as to the conse-
quences of refusing to answer relevant questions, and it also ques-
tioned whether the exclusion in this case was arbitrary and dis-
criminatory. The majority answered the first question in the
affirmative, citing Konigsberg I for the proposition that there was a
constitutional right to such a warning.87 On the second issue, the
Court made it clear that Illinois was permitted to deny admission
only as long as Anastaplo refused to answer relevant questions.
Thus, in the words of the Court, Anastaplo held "the key to admis-
sion in his own hands."38
Ten years later the Court decided the last three cases dealing
with questions to bar applicants. The Court was more evenly split
than in the past, with Justice Stewart providing the swing vote. In
two cases, Baird v. Arizona " and In re Stolar,40 the Court reversed
the denial of admission to the bar of two applicants who had re-
fused to answer questions on the state's applications. There was no
majority opinion in either case. 41 The opinion in Baird by Justice
Black began with a confession that "[s]harp conflicts and close di-
35. Id. at 88-89.
36. Id. at 90.
37. Id. at 90-91. There was no express holding on point in Konigsberg I, though the
statement appears in dicta. 353 U.S. at 261.
38. 366 U.S. at 97. Justice Black's dissenting opinion was based on his objection to the
majority's unwillingness to accept his absolute approach to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 279-81.
39. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
40. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
41. Black, J., was joined by Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, JJ., Stewart, J., con-
curred; Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Harlan and White, JJ., dissented; White, J.,
wrote a separate opinion.
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visions have arisen in this Court concerning the power of States to
refuse to permit applicants to practice law in cases where bar ex-
aminers have been suspicious about applicants' loyalties and their
views on Communism and revolution. 4 2
In Baird, the applicant refused to answer a question as to
membership in the Communist Party or organizations advocating
overthrow of the federal government by force or violence, although
she had listed on the application all of the organizations of which
she had been a member since age sixteen. Justice Black stated that
the First Amendment's protection of association prohibits a State
from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him solely
because he is a member of a particular political organization or
because he holds certain beliefs. Similarly, when a State attempts
to make inquiries about a person's beliefs or associations, its
power is limited by the First Amendment.... When a State
seeks to inquire about an individual's beliefs and associations a
heavy burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is necessary to
protect a legitimate state interest. Of course Arizona has a legiti-
mate interest in determining whether petitioner has the qualities
of character and the professional competence requisite to the
practice of law."3
After noting the information about her qualifications, Justice
Black stated that
whatever justification may be offered, a State may not inquire
about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of with-
holding a right or benefit because of what he believes .... [W]e
hold that views and beliefs are immune from bar association in-
quisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant
from the practice of law.44
Justice Black concluded that there was nothing in the record to
show that Baird was not morally or professionally fit to serve hon-
orably and well as a member of the legal profession.
Justice Stewart viewed the matter somewhat differently. He
cited Konigsberg II and Anastaplo in support of the statement
that "under some circumstances simple inquiry into present or
past Communist Party membership of an applicant for admission
42. 401 U.S. at 2-3.
43. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 7-8.
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to the Bar is not as such unconstitutional."' 5 However, in this case,
he felt Arizona had gone further in asking Baird about member-
ship in any organization that advocated violent overthrow of the
government. The defect in this question was that it was not limited
to "knowing membership. '4 In addition, Justice Stewart believed
that Arizona's reasons for asking the question made it clear that it
was an inquiry into political beliefs, because the questioning com-
mittee "would recommend denial of admission solely because of an
applicant's beliefs that the respondent found objectionable. '47
The dissenters, based on different factual conclusions, believed
that an affirmative answer to the disputed question would not have
resulted in automatic disqualification, but would only cause fur-
ther investigation.4" For the dissent, the membership inquiry was
relevant because Arizona had a legitimate interest in ensuring that
attorneys practicing in its courts refrained from forceful and vio-
lent overthrow of the government.
The disputed questions in In re Stolar" were somewhat differ-
ent from those in Baird. Stolar answered in the negative a question
concerning membership in the Communist Party, but refused to
answer a question concerning membership in any organization
which advocated overthrow of the government by force, and .re-
fused to list organizations in which he was or had been a member.
Thus Baird answered a question that Stolar refused to answer, and
vice versa. Justice Black again took the position that asking for the
list of organizations to which a person belonged was a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment because a person might refuse to join
an organization, fearing that it may 'hinder his admission to the
45. Id. at 9 (Stewart, J., concurring).
46. Citing Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971), and United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), Justice Stewart stated the rule that
"mere membership in an organization can never, by itself, be sufficient ground for a State's
imposition of civil disabilities or criminal punishment. Such membership can be quite differ-
ent from knowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of the Govern-
ment by force or violence, on the part of one sharing the specific intent to further the organ-
ization's illegal goals." 401 U.S. at 9 (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. 401 U.S. at 9 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Bar Committee, in a memorandum
filed in the Supreme Court, stated that the purpose of its question was to investigate
whether or not the applicant presently believed in the violent overthrow of the government.
The Committee stated it would oppose admission of a person who had such a belief. Id. at 8
n.8.
48. They based their conclusion on the same material relied on by the majority. See
note 47 supra.
49. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
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bar. Bar admission could not be denied on the basis of beliefs, in-
cluding beliefs on the subject of violent overthrow of the govern-
ment. Therefore, a state could not question an applicant on mem-
bership in organizations if the only relevance of such questioning
was to discover the beliefs of the applicant. Justice Stewart con-
curred in the judgment on the basis that under Baird the question
as to membership in an organization advocating violent overthrow
was prohibited, and under Shelton v. Tucker" a person could not
be compelled to list the organizations to which he belongs.51 Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion (also applicable to Baird) emphasized the
fact that the bar admission authorities were not interested in
purely philosophical beliefs; rather, the applicants, in refusing to
answer the questions, were obstructing the bar authorities' legiti-
mate inquiry into an applicant's likelihood of engaging in or incit-
ing violent opposition to the government.52 This was consistent
with his opinions in Konigsberg II and Anastaplo.5
The third case decided in 1971 was Law Students Civil Rights
Research Council v. Wadmond." Unlike the Baird and Stolar de-
cisions, all nine Justices agreed on the result in two of the five is-
sues, with four Justices dissenting on three issues. The two issues
upon which there was unanimity were that a state could establish
character and general fitness standards and that it could require
the applicant to take an oath to support the federal and state
constitutions.
The first issue on which there was disagreement was whether
it was a violation of the applicant's right to privacy to require that
his character references submit affidavits which would state how
often the reference had visited the applicant in his home. The ma-
jority found that the privacy claim "border[ed] on the frivolous." 55
More difficult was the requirement that the applicant furnish proof
50. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
51. 401 U.S. at 34.
52. Id. at 34-36.
53. In his dissent Justice Blackmun, speaking for himself, the Chief Justice and Jus-
tices Harlan and White, conceded the questions about organization memberships were inva-
lid under Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). He did not agree, however, that a state
could not ask about knowing membership in an organization that advocated violent over-
throw of the government and willingness to participate in that activity. 401 U.S. at 33-34.
54. 401 U.S. 154 (1971). Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; Harlan, J.,
concurred; Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., and Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissented.
55. Id. at 160.
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that he "believes in the form of government of the United States
and is loyal to such government. '" 6 Justice Stewart stated that this
language, standing alone, created "substantial constitutional ques-
tions, both as to the burden of proof permissible in such a context
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...
and as to the permissible scope of inquiring into an applicant's po-
litical beliefs under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."5 The
Court accepted, however, the representations from New York that
its rule did not place the burden of proof on an applicant; the
"form of government" referred only to the Constitution, and the
"belief" and "loyalty" in the oath meant no more than the willing-
ness and ability to take an oath to support the Constitution. On
the basis of those assurances, the Court found no constitutional
defect. There was no showing of an intent to penalize political be-
liefs. At most, the object of the rule was to insure that the taker of
the oath did not do so on a pro forma basis while in fact disagree-
ing with it.
The New York application had two questions, each divided
into two parts, to which the appellants objected. Question 26(a)
asked about knowing membership in any organization advocating
or teaching violent overthrow of the government, while 26(b) asked
whether, during the period of membership, the applicant had a
specific intent to further the organizational aim of overthrowing
the government by violent means. Question 27 inquired as to
whether the applicant was able to take the required oath in good
faith without reservation.
The Court had no difficulty in upholding the constitutional
validity of both questions. As to Question 26, the opinion noted
that
[w]e have held that knowing membership in an organization ad-
vocating the overthrow of the Government by force or violence,
on the part of one sharing the specific intent to further the organ-
ization's illegal goals, may be made criminally punishable .... It
is also well settled that Bar examiners may ask about Communist
affiliations as a preliminary to further inquiry into the nature of
the association and may exclude an applicant for refusal to
answer.58
56. Id. at 161.
57. Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 165-66.
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The portion of Question 27 relating to the oath was also upheld,
for the same reasons that the oath requirement of the rule had
been upheld.
The appellants also mounted a fundamental challenge to the
entire screening process. They argued that despite the validity of
individual questions or requirements, the screening system itself
represented "so constant a threat to applicants that constitutional
deprivations will be inevitable." 50 9 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, noting that accepting it would allow only the most minimal
screening of character for serious deficiencies, with the deterrent
and punitive effects of post-admission discipline remaining the
principal means of policing the bar. The Court held that the choice
between the two approaches was one of policy, to be made by the
state and not by the Court.60
The dissenters objected on the grounds that New York im-
properly placed the burden of proof on the applicant, inquired into
political beliefs, denied a benefit on the basis of beliefs only, at-
tempted to test the sincerity of an oath and, contrary to Baird and
Stolar, asked questions about membership in certain organizations.
Justice Black also raised a new objection-the fact that lawyers
constituted the examining committee. He stated that
[d]iscipline or denial of admission should only take place after
notice and hearing before an unquestionably impartial tribunal. I
must repeat once again that consistently with due process of law,
applicants for a profession cannot be turned over to the whim of
their prospective competitors to determine their right to
practice.61
Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness62 presented a
question of procedural due process. In that case an applicant for
the New York Bar was denied admission on several occasions over
a twenty-five year period based on an unfavorable report from the
character committee. He was never advised of the reasons for the
refusal, nor was he given the opportunity to refute those reasons,
or to confront any persons who may have provided information
against him. As is typical in bar admission cases, the procedure
utilized in the state court did not develop an adequate record nor
59. Id. at 167.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 185 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
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definition of issues, but the Supreme Court nonetheless decided
the principal issue in the case. Speaking for a majority of seven,
Justice Douglas stated that Willner "was clearly entitled to notice
of and a hearing on the ground for his rejection either before the
Committee or before the Appellate Division."6 Because he was not
afforded such a hearing, he had been denied his procedural due
process rights."
The last case dealing with an initial admission, In re Grif-
fiths,65 involved the requirement of the State of Connecticut that a
person must be a citizen of the United States to be admitted to
practice in that state. The applicant was a resident alien married
to a United States citizen, and a graduate of an American law
school. The Court decided seven to two, in an opinion by Justice
Powell, that Connecticut had not carried the "heavy burden of jus-
tification" required of a state attempting to impose a classification
based on alienage. To avoid violating the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the state "must show that its purpose
or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and
that its use of the classification is 'necessary . . . to the accom-
plishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest." 6
Connecticut first argued that an attorney is an officer of the court
with certain statutory powers, and that an alien has divided loyal-
ties which may interfere with his ability to serve the court system
or his clients. Rejecting this argument, the Court said that the
state could make a judgment on a case-by-case basis as to an indi-
vidual applicant's fitness to practice law, but had no basis to ex-
63. Id. at 105.
64. Id. at 106. Although the opinion discussed confrontation and cross-examination, it
was unclear whether the Court was asserting the applicant's right only to a hearing or also
to confrontation and cross-examination. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion, stated
that "in all cases in which admission to the bar is to be denied on the basis of character, the
applicant, at some stage of the proceedings prior to such denial, must be adequately in-
formed of the nature of the evidence... against him and be accorded an adequate opportu-
nity to rebut this evidence. .. [T]his does not mean that in every case confrontation and
cross-examination are automatically required." Id. at 107. Whether or not they are required
will depend upon the source of the derogatory information, with confrontation and cross-
examination required when the applicant questions a source's reliability or veracity. For
Justice Goldberg, reversal was necessary because the applicant had no right of confrontation
and because the record suggested that the admission denial may have been based on "con-
tradicted information supplied by informers whose credibility was challenged by the appli-
cant." Id. at 109.
65. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
66. Id. at 721-22.
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clude all aliens.6 7 The Court also dismissed Connecticut's argument
that an attorney, as an officer of the court, was also an officer of
the government and that the federal and state constitutions im-
posed many disqualifications upon aliens in the governmental pro-
cess." The Court noted that an attorney, while an officer of the
court, is not an officer of the government or a formulator of gov-
ernmental policy.
The Court has decided two cases involving the right of attor-
neys admitted in one state to practice in another. In Martin v.
Walton,69 an attorney who was admitted in both Missouri and
Kansas was prohibited from appearing in Kansas without a Kansas
attorney as co-counsel.70 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal
question, stating that the rules on their face and as applied in the
instant case did not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment. Jus-
tices Douglas and Black dissented, finding that the reasons given
by the Kansas Supreme Court for the rules, which involved the
ability to serve process upon attorneys practicing in Kansas courts
and familiarity with Kansas law and procedures, did not apply to
the appellant because he lived in Kansas and half his practice was
in that state. Justice Douglas felt that the law as applied bore no
relation to the targeted evil and thus it was unconstitutional to bar
the appellant from practicing in Kansas. 1
In Leis v. Flynt 2 an attorney, admitted in one state, sought
admission in another state for the purpose of handling a specific
case.7" The issue was whether Ohio was obligated to hold a hearing,
apply reasonably clear legal standards, and give a rational basis for
its decision, before it could prevent an out-of-state attorney from
67. Id. at 722-23.
68. Id. at 723. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, the latter's opin-
ion also applying to another case decided the same day which held that a state could not
automatically bar aliens from the state's civil service. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973).
69. 368 U.S. 25 (1961).
70. Two Kansas rules had the effect of preventing an attorney who was admitted in
Kansas and in another state and who regularly practiced in the other state from practicing
in Kansas courts without a Kansas co-counseL
71. 368 U.S. at 28. Justice Douglas conceded, however, that the rules would be consti-
tutional if applied to an attorney who, although admitted in Kansas, practiced only in
Missouri.
72. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
73. This process is usually referred to as admission pro hac vice.
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appearing in a specific case. In a per curiam opinion supported by
five Justices, the Court summarily reversed a decision by the Sixth
Circuit and held that there was neither a state nor a federal right
to appear pro hac vice. The majority noted that pro hac vice ap-
pearances were customary in the states and were to be encouraged
in view of the high mobility of the bar and the trend toward spe-
cialization; but they were not supported by a right granted by stat-
ute or the Constitution. The Court emphasized the fact that
"[s]ince the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation
of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District
of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions." 74
The major thrust of Justice Stevens' dissent was that either
the nature of the interest in pro hac vice admissions or the implicit
promise of Ohio to permit such admissions was sufficient to create
an interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Consequently the minority would require a hearing,
standards and a statement of reasons for denial. 5
The majority opinion referred to three prior cases76 that sus-
tained state rules excluding out-of-state attorneys from practice
absolutely or on a case-by-case basis. The minority distinguished
these cases, however, stating that two of them related only to the
establishment of permanent practices in states in which an attor-
ney was not licensed, while the third involved a substantive due
process claim rather than a claim that the rule was being applied
discriminatorily. Two of the cases were summarily affirmed with-
out opinion and the third was dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question.
B. Discipline
The role of state courts in discipline of attorneys has always
been clearer than their role in admission because a judicial order
has always been required to impose discipline upon attorneys. Not-
withstanding this, only three cases involving discipline of attorneys
by state courts have been decided by the Supreme Court, all on
74. 439 U.S. at 442.
75. Id. at 456. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the minority opinion. Justice
White did not join in either opinion, but wanted certiorari granted and the matter set for
oral argument.
76. Id. at 443 (citing Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Beatty, 423 U.S. 1009 (1975); Brown
v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 414 U.S. 1034 (1973); Kovrak v. Ginsburg, 358 U.S. 52 (1958)).
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procedural due process grounds."
In 1961 the Supreme Court decided the merits of the first in-
volving lawyer discipline. The Court, in Cohen v. Hurley,78 decided
that a state could disbar a lawyer for refusal to answer questions in
a judicial inquiry into "ambulance chasing," even though the re-
fusal was based upon a state privilege against self-incrimination.
Two issues were presented: first, did the Fourteenth Amendment
prevent making refusal to answer a question a per se ground for
disbarment, and second, is disbarment prohibited when the refusal
is based on the privilege against self-incrimination? The Court
held that the first issue was resolved by Konigsberg II and Anas-
taplo.79 After reciting the traditional power of English and Ameri-
can courts to discipline attorneys, the Court defined the second is-
sue before it as "whether arbitrary or discriminatory state action
can be found"80 in the effect of New York's exercise of the state
77. Two earlier cases raised similar issues but were not decided on the merits. The
first case came from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota. The territorial status
of the court limits the opinion's usefulness as a gloss on states' power, but some of the
comments made by Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9 (1856), aid in un-
derstanding the Court's views on attorney discipline in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Secombe had been disbarred by the Minnesota Supreme Court because he did not
maintain the respect due the courts and judicial officers of Minnesota. He sought a writ of
mandamus in the Supreme Court to compel tiTe Minnesota court to set aside an order dis-
barring him. The Court held that because the disbarment was a judicial act within the scope
of the court's jurisdiction and discretion, mandamus was not available to review the deci-
sion. Chief Justice Taney went beyond the jurisdictional issue, discussing both general prin-
ciples relating to the authority of a court to disbar, and the specifics of the Minnesota situa-
tion. He stated that "it has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one
of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." Id.
at 13. The Court noted also that the power must be exercised by a sound and just discretion,
protecting the rights and independence of the bar and the court. Id.
The next case, Manning v. Freuch, 133 U.S. 186 (1890), involved an action for damages
by an attorney against three persons who had acted as judges of a special federal court (the
Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims of the United States, initially created by an Act
of Congress, approved June 23, 1874, Chapter 459) and who had prohibited the attorney
from practicing in that court. The state court had held that the defendants were protected
by the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Supreme Court held that there was no federal
question involved (even though the legal existence of the federal court was challenged) and
dismissed the writ. Thus, the Court did not reach the issue of the power of courts generally
to discipline attorneys.
78. 366 U.S. 117 (1961). The Cohen opinion was handed down on the same day as
those in Konigsberg II and Anastaplo. All three opinions were written by Justice Harlan.
See notes 30-40 and accompanying text supra.
79. 366 U.S. at 123-25.
80. Id. at 125.
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privilege against self-incrimination. The majority answered in the
negative, viewing the problem as one of professional discipline
rather than as imposition of a penalty for invoking a constitutional
privilege.8 1
The Court also dealt with two other arguments: that the Four-
teenth Amendment provides a federal constitutional right against
self-incrimination and that lawyers were being put in a special
class suffering disabilities not imposed upon others. The Court
cited several cases which had rejected the former proposition.8 2 Re-
garding the second, the Court stated that
[w]e do not hold that lawyers, because of their special status in
society, can therefore be deprived of constitutional rights assured
to others, but only, as in all cases of this kind, that what proce-
dures are fair, what state process is constitutionally due, what
distinctions are consistent with the right to equal protection, all
depend upon the particular situation presented, and that history
is surely relevant to these injuries.8s
Six years later in Spevack v. Klein,s4 however, Cohen v. Hur-
ley was expressly overruled. Spevack involved a disbarment of a
New York lawyer for refusal to produce records or to testify at a
judicial inquiry. Justice Douglas wrote the plurality opinion over-
ruling Cohen on the ground that Malloy v. Hogan 5 held that the
Fourteenth Amendment included the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. The plurality further held that this
privilege extended to lawyers in disbarment proceedings.88 Justice
Douglas expressly adopted the dissent's view in Cohen that any
penalty for invoking the Fifth Amendment, including disbarment,
was prohibited. The opinion did not reach the question of whether
the protection extended to the production of records because, at all
levels of the disbarment proceeding other than in the New York
Court of Appeals, it was assumed that the privilege did apply. Jus-
81. Id. at 125-26.
82. Id. at 128-29.
83. Id. at 129-30 (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black,
Douglas and Brennan dissented.
84. 385 U.S. 511 (1967). Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Black and Brennan,
JJ., wrote the plurality opinion; Fortas, J., concurred separately; Harlan, J., joined by Clark,
Stewart and White, JJ., dissented.
85. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
.86. 385 U.S. at 514-16. Justice Fortas' concurrence was based upon his view that gov-
ernment employees, unlike lawyers, were not entitled to claim the protection of the self-
incrimination clause.
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tice Harlan, in his dissent, argued that Malloy v. Hogan did not
require the overruling of Cohen v. Hurley. For him, the issue was
whether the disbarment of an attorney for failure to provide infor-
mation concerning charges of professional misconduct impermissi-
bly violated the constitutional protection. He advocated the use of
the balancing test between the interests of the individual in the
constitutional privilege and those of society in seeking the informa-
tion. Justice Harlan did not believe the result in Spevack to be
justified by prior decisions on the protection afforded by the privi-
lege, and ignored the justification of the state's need to protect its
judicial system.
In re Ruffalo80 7 was a case involving disbarment by a federal
court, but it turned on the constitutionality of a state disbarment
proceeding. Ruffalo had been disbarred by a federal district court
and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
based upon his disbarment by the Ohio Supreme Court. The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, held that the Ohio proce-
dure violated due process, and that as a result the federal disbar-
ment also violated due process.
The defect in the Ohio proceedings was determined to be that
the charge upon which the disbarment was based was not included
in the original charges but was added to them only after the attor-
ney and others had testified in the disbarment proceeding itself.
The additional charge was based on that testimony. The attorney's
motion to strike the additional charge was denied but he had been
granted a continuance to respond to it. In viewing the Ohio proce-
dure, the Court noted that cases involving disbarment in the fed-
eral courts had established that an attorney is entitled to fair no-
tice of the charges against him and an opportunity for explanation
and defense, and that because the proceeding is adversary and
quasi-criminal in nature,88 the charge must be known before the
proceedings begin. Applying these principles to the facts before it,
the Court concluded that the procedure becomes "a trap when, af-
ter they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of
testimony of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity to
expunge the earlier statements and start afresh." 89 The Court then
concluded that because of the absence of fair notice as to the ex-
87. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
88. Id. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
89. 390 U.S. at 551.
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tent of the grievance procedure and the precise nature of the
charges, Ruffalo had been denied due process of law in the Ohio
proceeding and that federal disbarment could therefore not be
based upon it.90
C. Practice
Several cases involving issues of how an attorney practices law
or what he must do (or not do) to remain qualified to practice law
have reached the Supreme Court. In Lathrop v. Donohue91 a chal-
lenge was made to compulsory membership in the Wisconsin State
Bar by a Wisconsin attorney who objected to paying the annual
$15 membership fee. He argued that it was unconstitutional for
him to be compelled by that state's supreme court92 "to join and
give support to an organization which has among its functions the
expression of opinion on legislative matters and which utilizes its
property, funds and employees for the purposes of influencing leg-
islation and public opinion toward legislation.""3
The Court found that mandatory bar membership9 was not
unconstitutional. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion.95
The heart of the issue, as viewed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and accepted in Justice Brennan's opinion, was the requirement
that a Wisconsin attorney pay $15 each year to support some polit-
ical activities with which the attorney may disagree. The opinion
90. Id. at 552. Harlan, J. and White, J., joined by Marshall, J., filed concurring
opinions.
91. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
92. Membership in the state bar was made compulsory by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, which also imposed a membership fee. Before dealing with the substantive issues, the
Court first resolved the procedural question of whether the supreme court order making
state bar membership mandatory was a "statute" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(c),
thus making appeal an appropriate remedy. The Court unanimously concluded that it was,
finding that the challenged order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not result from litiga-
tion but "[r]ather the court sought to regulate the profession by applying its orders to all
present members of the Bar and to all persons coming within the described class in the
future .... As such, the action had the characteristics of legislation." 367 U.S. at 827 (cita-
tion omitted).
93. Id.
94. A bar association to which a person must belong as a condition of a license to
practice law was originally called an "integrated" bar. When the term "integrated" took on
an almost exclusively racial connotation, the designation of "unified" bar was used. The
author believes the more accurate terminology to be "mandatory" bar membership.
95. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). Brennan, J., was joined by Warren, C.J., and Clark and Stew-
art, JJ.; Harlan J., joined by Frankfurter, J., & Whittaker, J., concurred separately; Black,
J., & Douglas, J., each dissented separately.
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reviewed the legislative activities of the state bar and concluded
that they did not constitute a major part of the total activities of
the organization. On that basis, the plurality concluded that
Wisconsin,
in order to further the State's legitimate interests in raising the
quality of professional services, may constitutionally require that
the costs of improving the profession in this fashion should be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory pro-
gram, the lawyers, even though the organization created to attain
the objective also engaged in some legislative activity. Given the
character of the integrated bar shown on this record, in the light
of the limitation of the membership requirement to the compul-
sory payment of reasonable annual dues, we are unable to find
any impingement upon protected rights of association. 6
Lathrop also complained that his freedom of speech was im-
pinged by the mandatory bar membership. The plurality found no
basis in the record for deciding that question. At no point did
Lathrop show how any position taken by the state bar on a politi-
cal matter was inconsistent with his own beliefs. There was also
nothing in the record to show how much the state bar spent on
political action to which Lathrop objected. Justice Brennan con-
cluded by stating that the plurality did not decide the issue of
whether an attorney could be compelled by a state to contribute
financial support to political activities he opposes.97
The Supreme Court has written only one opinion dealing with
state efforts to control the unauthorized practice of law. In Sperry
v. Florida98 the state sought to enjoin a non-lawyer, admitted to
practice before the Patent Office, from engaging in any activities
relating to his patent practice in Florida. The Court, in a unani-
96. Id. at 843.
97. Id. at 847-48. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter disagreed with the plurality only on
the question of the constitutionality of the use of bar dues for political activity opposed by
an individual attorney. They believed that the issue had no merit. They could see no dis-
tinction between freedom of assocation, which the plurality held was not violated, and free-
dom of speech involved in the political activity. Justice Whittaker based his short concur-
rence on his view of the practice of law as a privilege and not a right.
Justice Black also believed that the political activity question should be decided. His
view was, of course, contrary to the three concurring justices. He believed it a clear violation
of the First Amendment to compel a person to support a cause to which he is opposed.
Justice Douglas went one step further, opposing even the requirement than an attorney
belong to a bar association.
98. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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mous opinion by Chief Justice Warren, held that federal regulation
of practice before the Patent Office and activities relating thereto
overrode any contrary state regulation by virtue of the supremacy
clause.
A State may not enforce licensing requirements which, though
valid in the absence of federal regulation, give "the State's licens-
ing board a virtual power of review over the federal determina-
tion" that a person or agency is qualified and entitled to perform
certain functions, or which impose upon the performance of activ-
ity sanctioned by federal license additional conditions not con-
templated by Congress."
The Court viewed the legislative history as clearly indicating a con-
gressional intent to permit non-lawyers to act as patent agents.
One issue left unresolved by the Court was whether a non-lawyer
who is licensed to practice by the Patent Office can identify him-
self as a patent "attorney." The legislative history quoted by the
Court suggests that Congress drew a distinction between a non-
lawyer patent agent and a patent attorney.100 The Court acknowl-
edged that Florida had a substantial interest in the subject and
could have validly prohibited the questioned conduct in the ab-
sence of federal legislation. The Court also expressly did not ques-
tion Florida's authority to define the conduct as constituting the
practice of law.
The power of a state court to punish an attorney for conduct
in the course of litigation was tested in Holt v. Virginia.'0 The
case arose when an attorney, Dawley, was charged with contempt
of court in a libel case. He hired another attorney, Holt, to re-
present him in the contempt proceeding. Dawley filed a motion to
disqualify the judge, and it was denied. He then filed a motion for
a change of venue. At the hearing on that motion Holt appeared
for Dawley and read the motion in open court. The judge found its
content personally offensive and summarily held Dawley and Holt
in contempt of court and fined each $50. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia upheld the convictions on the ground that the
motion heaped insults on the judge and was an attempt to smear
him. The Supreme Court reversed both convictions in an eight-to-
99. Id. at 385.
100. Id. at 395. This issue was not decided, however. Sperry ceased using the designa-
tion "attorney" and the issue became moot.
101. 381 U.S. 131 (1965).
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one decision authored by Justice Black.
Although Dawley was an attorney, he was found in contempt
for his acts as a litigant. Holt, on the other hand, was convicted
solely on the basis of his acts as an attorney. However, the Court
made no such distinction in its analysis because it viewed the case
as one involving the due process right to a fair trial.10 2 This right,
the Court held, included the right to an unbiased tribunal, and a
motion for change of venue to achieve a fair tribunal is essential
for the protection of that right. "Consequently, neither Dawley nor
his counsel could consistently with due process be convicted for
contempt for filing these motions unless it might be thought that
there is something about the language used which would justify the
conviction."' 03 The Court concluded that the language used in the
change of venue motion was nothing more than that necessary to
accuse the judge of bias, the basis for the change of venue motion.
State efforts to control solicitation of legal business have come
before the Court in two general areas: one relating to the activities
of attorneys and the other to the activities of non-attorneys. Three
of the four non-attorney cases involved unions. The non-union
case, NAACP v. Button,'0' arose out of an attempt by Virginia to
restrict the activities of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People during the late 1950's and early 1960's at
the height of the Civil Rights Movement. The Virginia legislature
had amended the state's anti-solicitation statute to make illegal
the employment of an attorney in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding when the employer was not a party to the proceeding nor
had any pecuniary interest in it. Under this statute, the NAACP
would be prohibited from supplying counsel to persons who
wanted to attack racial discrimination in court.
The Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, declared the
statute unconstitutional. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority
of five, declared that the statute violated the First Amendment
rights of the NAACP and its members. The Court found that, for
the NAACP, litigation was probably its most effective means of po-
litical association. The Court read the statute broadly as "proscrib-
102. Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the difference between the Supreme Court
and the Virginia courts on the professional propriety of the attorneys' actions did not rise to
constitutional proportions. Id. at 138.
103. Id. at 136-37.
104. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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ing any arrangement by which prospective litigants are advised to
seek the assistance of particular attorneys." 105 One argument made
on behalf of the statute was that the interest of Virginia in regulat-
ing the legal profession justified the limitation of First Amendment
rights; specifically, that defining improper solicitation fell within
the traditional purview of state regulation of professional conduct.
The Court rejected this argument, saying that "a state may not,
under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore con-
stitutional rights. . . .However valid may be Virginia's interest in
regulating the traditionally illegal practices of barratry, mainte-
nance and champerty, that interest does not justify the prohibition
of the NAACP activities disclosed by this record."10 The Court
approved the traditional restrictions on attorneys misusing the le-
gal process, but did not find such conduct in the case before it. 10
7
In a series of three cases decided between 1964 and 1971, the
Court resolved several issues relating to union members employing
attorneys, with union assistance, to handle legal claims. All three
cases, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, e8 United
Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar,10 9 and United Transportation
Union v. State Bar of Michigan'" turned upon First Amendment
protection of this union activity. In Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, the union advised its members not to settle injury
105. Id. at 433.
106. Id. at 439. The Court went on to note that "[m]alicious intent was of the essence
of the common-law offenses of fomenting or stirring up litigation. . . .Even more modem,
subtler regulations of unprofessional conduct or interference with professional relations, not
involving malice, would not touch the activities at bar, regulations which reflect hostility to
stirring up litigation have been aimed chiefly at those who urge recourse to the courts for
private gain, serving no public interest." Id. at 439-40.
Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clark and Stewart con-
curred, because he believed the "striking down of this Virginia statute cannot be squared
with accepted constitutional doctrine in the domain of state regulatory power over the legal
profession." Id. at 448.
107. Id. at 442-43. The Court also voiced some concern over possible lay control over
litigation, but did not feel that issue was raised by the activities of the NAACP, particularly
because there were no monetary interests involved.
However, Justice Harlan, in his dissent, likened the challenged statute to traditional
prohibitions against soliciting legal business, arguing that limitations on solicitation were
not addressed solely to those activities which had a pecuniary objective. It was more impor-
tant to prevent an interference with the attorney-client relationship that could result when
the attorney is emIloyed by a third party. Id. at 459-60.
108. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
109. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
110. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
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claims without the advice of a lawyer and recommended certain
attorneys to handle the claims. In United Mine Workers, the
union employed a licensed attorney on a salary basis to represent
any of its members who desired to prosecute workmen's compensa-
tion claims before a state agency. United Transportation Union
involved a union practice of recommending certain Chicago attor-
neys who would not charge a contingent fee of more than 25% to
members with possible Federal Employers' Liability Act claims.
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in each of the three cases,
with Justice Harlan consistently dissenting.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen relied primarily upon
NAACP v. Button"' for the proposition that regulation of the pro-
fessions cannot justify an infringement of a First Amendment free-
dom. 112 The opinion also expressly extended constitutional protec-
tion to attorneys who accepted employment under such union
plans.
Justice Black, in his opinion for seven members of the Court
in United Mine Workers, relied on both NAACP and Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen. He rejected arguments that NAACP was
limited to simply advising members about attorneys. The com-
bined holdings of these two cases thus was found to protect the use
of employed counsel to represent members' private claims. The
Court also stressed that the prohibition was not necessary to pro-
tect the state's interest in high standards of legal ethics.11 8
The majority in United Transportation Union relied upon the
three previous cases and found the challenged activity covered by
those decisions. 11
Cases involving state regulation of the bar have usually come
111. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See notes 104-07 and accompanying text supra.
112. Justices Clark and Harlan observed, in dissenting opinions, that NAACP v. But-
ton was premised upon the fact that the litigation in those cases was designed to secure
constitutionally protected civil rights and not personal injury claims. They viewed the union
plan as one involving great potential danger, which the state could prevent through its
power to regulate the bar. Id. at 452-65.
113. 389 U.S. at 225. Justice Harlan's dissent was again based upon his strong views in
support of state regulation of the legal profession and prohibition of the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. He protested that states should be free to regulate their bars without interfer-
ence from the Supreme Court in the absence of demonstrated arbitrary or discriminatory
regulation.
114. 401 U.S. at 585-86. Justice Harlan dissented only in part, distinguishing union
activities shown in the other cases. Here, he saw no improper union activity to justify the
regulation.
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to the Supreme Court in clusters, with one or more related issues
dominating for a limited period of time. The last of these clusters
involves four cases dealing with attempts by the states to prohibit
solicitation by attorneys.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,11 5 two non-attorneys chal-
lenged a minimum fee schedule adopted by a county bar associa-
tion but enforced by the Virginia State Bar through its disciplinary
procedure. The plaintiffs charged that the schedule and its en-
forcement violated section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.1 6
The Court, in a unanimous" opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
held that the mandatory fee schedule in question did constitute
price fixing and was thus a restraint on trade in violation of the
federal statute. The fee was a 1% charge on the sales price for a
title examination of real estate. Although the state bar had never
filed charges against anyone for violating a fee schedule, it had is-
sued an opinion stating that habitually charging fees below the
minimum fee schedule would constitute solicitation.
The opinion considered four questions. The first was whether
the acts of the county and state bar associations constituted price
fixing. The Court held they did because the schedule was not
merely advisory but "was enforced through the prospect of profes-
sional discipline from the State Bar, and the desire of attorneys to
comply with announced professional norms... ; the motivation to
conform was reinforced by the assurance that other lawyers would
not compete by underbidding." 1 8 The second question was
whether or not the fee schedule affected interstate commerce. The
Court found that it did because substantial funds for purchasing
homes in the affected county came from outside Virginia, and be-
cause a title examination was a requirement of obtaining the
funds. The Court concluded that "a title examination is an integral
part of an interstate transaction .... ,,19
The third question presented to the Court was whether the
Sherman Act was intended to apply to the learned professions.
The Court found neither an explicit nor implicit exemption of the
115. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
117. Justice Powell took no part in the case.
118. 421 U.S. at 781-82.
119. Id. at 784.
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professions from the Act.12
Finally, the Court settled a question raised by both the county
bar (a voluntary organization) and the state bar (a mandatory bar),
each of which claimed to fall within the "state action" exemption
to the Sherman Act. The Court rejected these claims. It found that
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia did not adopt the fee
schedule nor a rule making the schedule mandatory. In fact, the
supreme court's rules governing the state bar provided that an at-
torney should not be controlled by a fee schedule in setting his
fees. Even though attorneys were required to belong to the state
bar and even though for certain purposes it could be considered a
state agency, the Virginia Supreme Court did not expressly direct
the state bar to adopt fee schedules or to enforce them. Conse-
quently, the state bar's activities as to fee schedules were not state
action.""
The opinion concluded by acknowledging that states have a
"compelling interest" in the practice of professions, and that they
have broad licensing and regulatory power. They may in some in-
stances restrict some forms of competition they regard as
demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession.... The
interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great
since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function
of administering justice and have historically been 'officers of the
courts.'.. . In holding that certain anticompetitive conduct of
lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no dim-
inution of the authority of the State to regulate its professions.122
Advertising by attorneys, long banned as a form of solicitation,
came before the Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.123 Two
Arizona attorneys were censured by the Arizona Supreme Court
for advertising in contravention of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility adopted by that court and binding upon Arizona attor-
neys. The attorneys argued that the ban violated both the First
Amendment and the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Blackmun joined by four other justices, held
that the advertising ban was within the state action exemption to
120. Id. at 785-88.
121. Id. at 791. The Court reached the same conclusion regarding the county bar asso-
ciation, based upon its purely voluntary character. Id. at 792.
122. Id. at 792-93 (citations omitted).
123. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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the Sherman Act, but violated the First Amendment rights of at-
torneys. The other four justices124 agreed with the decision on the
Sherman Act claim, but disagreed with the majority on the First
Amendment question.
All members of the Court had no difficulty in finding state ac-
tion in the advertising ban, which was adopted and enforced by the
state supreme court. Goldfarb was easily distinguished because of
the lack of involvement of the Virginia Supreme Court in adopting
or enforcing the minimum fee schedule in that case.
The analysis of the First Amendment problem was far more
difficult. The Court defined the issue narrowly, stating that it was
concerned only with advertising the prices of routine legal services.
It was not concerned with the quality of the ads, nor did the Court
deal with the issue of in-person solicitation. The state bar offered
several justifications for the advertising ban.1 25 Justice Blackmun
found each of them either without merit or supportive of a con-
trary position. But the Court did not hold that advertising by at-
torneys could not be regulated at all. Valid regulations would in-
clude those covering false, deceptive or misleading advertising and
claims as to the quality of services and in-person solicitation. The
Court suggested that, as with all advertising, lawyers could be sub-
jected to reasonable restrictions as to time, place and manner, and
the Court specifically stated that advertising on the electronic
broadcast media would warrant special consideration. The Court
concluded that
[t]he constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State
may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truth-
ful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine
legal services. We rule simply that the flow of such information
may not be restrained, and we therefore hold the present applica-
tion of the disciplinary rule against appellants to be violative of
124. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist each wrote separate
opinions, with Justice Stewart concurring in part with the Powell opinion.
125. These were: 1) the adverse effect on professionalism, i.e., that advertising will
bring about commercialization, erode the client's trust in his attorney, and tarnish the image
of the profession; 2) advertising is inherently misleading because legal services are too indi-
vidualized, the consumer does not know what services he needs, and the essential factor of
skill is ignored; 3) advertising will foment litigation; 4) advertising has the undesirable eco-
nomic effects of increasing the cost of legal, services to the public while making it more
difficult for persons to enter the profession; 5) the quality of service is diminished because of
the need to stay within the advertised price; and 6) any restriction less than a wholesale ban
will be too difficult to enforce. Id. at 368-79.
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the First Amendment.12
The next two opinions of the Supreme Court on solicitation by
attorneys were handed down on the same day. Justice Powell wrote
both opinions, which reached opposite results. The first, In re
Primus,'12 7 arose out of efforts by the American Civil Liberties
Union to assist women in South Carolina who had been sterilized
as a condition of receiving public assistance. An attorney in private
practice but who was affiliated with the ACLU spoke to a meeting
about the legal rights of such women. After the meeting the ACLU
informed the attorney that it would provide legal representation to
women who had been sterilized. The attorney, after learning that
one of the women who attended the meeting was interested in
filing suit based on sterilization, wrote to her advising her of the
ACLU's offer. On the basis of the letter, the attorney was publicly
reprimanded by the South Carolina Supreme Court for violating
the ban on solicitation contained in the state's Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.
Justice Powell found the issue to be whether a state may pun-
ish an attorney who, "seeking to further political and ideological
goals through associational activity, including litigation, advises a
lay person of her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter
that free legal assistance is available from a non-profit organization
with which the lawyer and her associates are affiliated. ' 12 8 The
opinion began by noting that the case concerned the tension be-
tween contending values of freedom of expression and state regula-
tion of the bar. Justice Powell, quoting Goldfarb, cited the states'
broad power and great interest in the legal profession arising from
the essential role attorneys play in the administration of justice.1 29
Essentially, the case turned on whether the conduct of Primus was
found to be within the ambit of NAACP v. Button'30 and the three
126. Id. at 384. Justice Powell wrote the principal dissent. In his view, professional
services by their nature are not routine and a lay person would not have enough information
to judge the nature of the advertised product. He also thought that neither the bar nor state
disciplinary agencies could make sure that advertising was not false or misleading. Finally,
he said that the Court's ruling would weaken each state's traditional control over the bar,
and the possibility of experimentation implicit in that control, for the very marginal benefit
to be gained by the public from the type of advertising permitted by the decision. Id. at
391-97.
127. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
128. Id. at 414.
129. Id. at 422.
130. See notes 104-07 and accompanying text supra.
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union solicitation cases.131 The Court held that it was, and that the
First Amendment right thus prevailed over the state's authority
over the bar. In large part the decision was based on a finding that
the ACLU's involvement in litigation was not for financial gain;
rather, it was a form of political expression similar to that engaged
in by the NAACP. The Court concluded that disciplinary rules
which prohibit an ACLU attorney from advising a lay person that
he may retain the organization's free legal services "have a distinct
potential for dampening the kind of 'cooperative activity that
would make advocacy of litigation meaningful'... as well as for
permitting discretionary enforcement against unpopular causes. 132
The Court also emphasized that a higher standard is applied
when political expression or activity is at issue. They compared
this to the lesser standard tolerated when purely commercial activ-
ity is present, as in the companion case decided the same day. Po-
tential danger may suffice to permit a general restriction of the lat-
ter, but in the former "a State must regulate with significantly
greater precision."138 The opinion was careful to explain, after ref-
erences to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 3' and Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association,3 5 that "nothing in this opinion should be
read to foreclose carefully tailored regulation that does not abridge
unnecessarily the associational freedom of non-profit organizations,
or their members, having characteristics like those of the NAACP
or the ACLU."""
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,13 7 decided the same
day as Primus, was the other end of the solicitation spectrum. In
this case, attorney Ohralik was suspended indefinitely by the Ohio
Supreme Court for violating two Disciplinary Rules of Ohio's Code
of Professional Responsibility.138 The Supreme Court affirmed the
131. See notes 108-11 and accompanying text supra.
132. Id. at 433 (citing NAACP v. Button).
133. Id. at 438.
134. See notes 105-06 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 137-42 and accompanying text infra.
136. 436 U.S. at 439. Justices Blackmun and Marshall concurred with some qualifica-
tions, while Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the individual contact by
Primus with the potential litigant went beyond the NAACP case.
137. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
138. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A) prohibits an attorney from recommending employ-
ment of himself to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice on the question. Disciplinary
Rule 2-104(A) directs that an attorney who has given unsolicited advice that a non-lawyer
should retain counsel shall not accept employment resulting from the advice.
[Vol. 8:199
suspension. 3 9
The facts presented a classic case of in-person solicitation.
Ohralik contacted two persons who had been injured in an automo-
bile accident. He visited one in the hospital on two occasions and
on the second visit obtained a written contingent fee agreement.
He made an oral agreement with the other, whom he had con-
tacted on the day she left the hospital. Subsequently, both persons
discharged him and he sued one of them for breach of contract,
obtaining part of an insurance recovery in settlement of his claim.
He also sued the other, but dropped the suit after he was sus-
pended by the Ohio Supreme Court.
Ohralik claimed that his soliciting activity was protected by
the First Amendment and that he came within the protection of
the Bates decision. The Court rejected this argument. It began its
consideration of the question by noting that the solicitation of bus-
iness by an attorney through direct, in-person contact with the
prospective client "has long been viewed as inconsistent with the
profession's ideal of the attorney-client relationship and as posing
a significant potential for harm to the prospective client."1 40 Bates
did not predetermine the result here because "[t]he entitlement of
in-person solicitation of clients to the protection of the First
Amendment differs from that of the kind of advertising approved
in Bates, as does the strength of the State's countervailing interest
in prohibition."'" The Court stressed that although some commer-
cial speech is constitutionally protected, it enjoys lesser protection
than non-commercial speech. Moreover, the Court noted that all
conduct is not protected simply because it involves some speech.
The Court found in-person solicitation to be a business transaction
in which speech is an essential but subordinate part. Having thus
characterized Ohralik's transactions, the Court applied a lower
standard of judicial scrutiny to the regulation than that applied in
Bates. The opinion weighed the slight free speech component
against the state's interest in regulating the type of conduct in
question. It found the state's regulatory interest very strong be-
cause of the role of the legal profession and because of the substan-
139. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment and partially concurred in the opin-
ion. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, and Justice Brennan did not participate
in the case.
140. Id. at 454.
141. Id. at 455.
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tive evils of solicitation including fraud, undue influence, intimida-
tion and overreaching. The Court stated that it was not necessary
to find a specific injury to the two solicited clients. Rather, it
viewed the disciplinary rules as preventive measures and found
that the state's assessment for the potential of harm was justified.
It would be too difficult to require the state to show actual harm
because the solicitation was not, like the advertising in Bates, done
in the open and subject to public scrutiny; thus, effective oversight
and regulation would be impossible. The Court then reviewed the
facts in the case, concluding that they presented "a striking exam-
ple of the potential for overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer's
in-person solicitation of professional employment. They also
demonstrate[d] the need for prophylactic regulation in furtherance
of the State's interest in protecting the lay public.1 142
The most recent case decided by the Supreme Court was Su-
preme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,143 an opinion
handed down in June 1980. The case arose out of the effort in 1974
by the Consumers Union to publish a legal services directory. Law-
yers in Virginia refused to participate because of the ban on adver-
tising then contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility
adopted in Virginia. The Consumers Union and others then filed
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983144 against the Virginia Supreme
Court, the American and Virginia Bar Associations, and several in-
dividuals including the state chief justice. The plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the defendants had violated their freedom of ex-
pression rights and also sought a permanent injunction against en-
forcement of that portion of the Code that banned advertising. At
the request of the defendants, the case was postponed on the basis
that the American Bar Association and the state bar were prepar-
ing amendments to the Code to relax the prohibition against ad-
vertising. Notwithstanding a change in the ABA Code and a re-
quest from the state bar, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to
change the Code. The district court then proceeded to hear the
case on the merits. It held the ban on advertising unconstitutional,
permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing any part of it ex-
cept the prohibition against advertising fees other than for initial
142. Id. at 468.
143. 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
144. This section provides a statutory remedy for constitutional violations which occur
under color of state law.
[Vol. 8:199
consultation. Both sides appealed, but while the appeal was pend-
ing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona was decided. In light of Bates,
the Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration.
On remand, the district court again declared the section of the
Code at issue unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The
plaintiffs then moved for an award of attorney's fees.145 The dis-
trict court held that the Virginia Supreme Court and its chief jus-
tice were liable to pay a fee but that the state bar and its officers
were not because they had originally requested the state supreme
court to change the ban on advertising. The district court based its
decision as to liability of the supreme court and the chief justice on
their refusal to amend the Code in light of Bates.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion 146 by
Justice White, vacated and remanded. The Court held that the
Virginia court, when it adopted the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility and refused to amend it, was acting in a legislative capacity
and was entitled to the same absolute immunity as legislators for
its actions of a legislative nature. The Court also held that the
state supreme court was entitled to judicial immunity for any ac-
tion of an adjudicative nature in a disciplinary proceeding. The
state court also, however, had the authority to initiate proceedings
against attorneys. This enforcement power, the Court said, made
the Virginia'court and its members proper defendants in a suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court had previously recog-
nized that prosecutors, although immune from damages liability,147
were subject to § 1983 suits seeking injunctive relief.1 48
The Court did not consider, however, that the district court
had properly exercised its discretion in ordering the Virginia court
and its chief justice to pay attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The
basis for the award was the Virginia court's refusal to amend the
Code of Professional Responsibility. This action, or non-action,
was an aspect of the court's legislative, rather than enforcement,
function for which it was immune from suit. The Court concluded:
"Because the Virginia court is immune from suit with respect to its
legislative functions, it runs counter to that immunity for a district
court's discretion in allowing fees to be guided by considerations
145. This is authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
146. Justice Powell took no part in this case.
147. Inbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
148. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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centering on the exercise or non-exercise of the state court's legis-
lative powers. '149
The opinion left open the issue of whether an award for attor-
ney's fees against both the state bar and the Virginia court for
their enforcement roles might be obtained. The Court was of the
view that unless than were some special circumstances not shown
in the record, an award against both the state bar and the Virginia
court premised on their enforcement functions would be proper.
The case was remanded for further proceedings, with the district
court invited, if not directed, to award attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs.
D. The Federal Bar
The Supreme Court has acted in a number of matters involv-
ing regulation of attorneys who practice or seek to practice in the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court. For the most part,
opinions written in these matters are not relevant to the Supreme
Court's decisions on state regulation of the legal profession because
of the limited role the Supreme Court has in the latter. There are,
however, a few opinions in which the Supreme Court has stated
views that may be relevant to state regulation of the bar, on the
nature of the legal profession or the interest of an attorney in the
practice of law.
In its first opinion discussing the legal profession, Ex parte
Burr,150 the Court balanced the competing interests of the attor-
ney's right to practice his profession and the necessity for courts to
maintain the respectability of the bar. The Court left the responsi-
bility for weighing these competing interests to the discretion of
the admitting court. It stated that that court should exercise its
power with great caution, though it is a power necessary for the
preservation of decorum and the respectability of the profession.
One federal case cited with any regularity in state regulation
cases is Ex parte Garland.151 There, the Court held unconstitu-
tional, as violating the ban on ex post facto punishments, an act of
Congress passed in 1865 requiring attorneys admitted to practice
in the federal courts to take a supplementary oath that they had
149. 446 U.S. at 739.
150. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824).
151. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
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neither held nor exercised any office in a government hostile to the
United States. The Court stated that an attorney admitted in a
federal court is not an officer of the United States, but an officer of
the federal court. He holds his office during good behavior and can
be deprived of it only for misconduct ascertained and declared by
the admitting court, after an opportunity to be heard. Admission
and explusion are exercises of the judicial power. An attorney's
right to practice after admission can be taken away only for rea-
sons of moral or professional delinquency. Congress can prescribe
the qualifications for admission, but it cannot use that power to
punish past conduct in violation of the ex post facto prohibition of
the Constitution.
In Bradley v. Fisher152 the Court upheld the disbarment of an
attorney by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, noting
that all courts having the authority to admit attorneys to practice
also have the power to disbar them.153 That power should not be
exercised, however, without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Nor should disbarment be ordered where a lesser penalty will ac-
complish the end sought. The Court also emphasized that an attor-
ney must at all times, in and out of court, maintain the respect due
to the courts and judicial officers.
Ex parte Wall'" raised the question of whether an attorney
may be disbarred upon conviction of an offense committed while
not acting as an attorney. The Court held that a conviction was not
always a prerequisite, but that the circumstances in each case
should dictate whether disbarment should be required. The Court
held also that there is no right to a jury trial in a disbarment for
cause situation.
Theard v. United States5 5 involved the issue of whether dis-
barment in a state court was grounds for automatic disbarment in
federal court. In holding it was not, the Court in an opinion by
Justice Frankfurter commented on the relationship between the
federal courts and state control of the legal profession.
It is not for this Court, except within the narrow limits for
review open to this Court, as recently canvassed in Konigsberg v.
California and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners to sit in judg-
152. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
153. See also Bx parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1873).
154. 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
155. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
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ment on Louisiana disbarments, and we are not in any event sit-
ting in review of the Louisiana judgment. While a lawyer is ad-
mitted into a federal court by way of a state court, he is not
automatically sent out of the federal court by the same route. The
two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the fed-
eral judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their
officers, among whom, in the present context, lawyers are in-
cluded. The court's control over a lawyer's professional life de-
rives from his relation to the responsibilities of a court. The mat-
ter was compendiously put by Mr. Justice Cardozo, while Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. "'Membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.' The appellant was
received into that ancient fellowship for something more than pri-
vate gain. He became an officer of the court, and, like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."
The power of disbarment is necessary for the protection of the
public in order to strip a man of the implied representation by
courts that a man who is allowed to hold himself out to practice
before them is in "good standing" so to do.156
III. Analysis
Although the review of the Supreme Court opinions concern-
ing state regulation of the legal profession in section II is divided
on the basis of three subject matters, this division is not appropri-
ate for an analysis of the opinions because many of the principles
developed by the Court are equally applicable to each of the divi-
sions. For this reason, all of the opinions will be treated as a single
group and the various principles will be viewed as applicable to all
areas of state regulation of the bar unless otherwise specifically
noted.
A. Supreme Court Review of State Regulation of the
Legal Profession
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the primary in-
156. Id. at 278 (quoting In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917) and
People ex rel. Karlin v. Cukin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928)) (citations
omitted).
In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959), an attorney discipline case which arose in the territo-
rial courts of Hawaii, is an often cited case involving the extent to which an attorney's
speech outside the courtroom can be the basis for discipline. It can give little guidance,
however. There were two conflicting opinions each of which gained four adherents.
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terest of the states in regulating the bar. In Bradwell v. Illinois15
and In re Lockwood' " the Court went so far as to hold that
neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the privileges and immu-
nities clause of the Federal Constitution applied to the admission
to practice law and, presumably, to other aspects of state regula-
tion of the bar. The effect of these two cases, decided in 1872 and
1894, was such that it was not until 1945 that the Court in In re
Summers15 9 wrote an opinion on the merits of a claim that a fed-
eral right was violated by a state in a denial of admission to the
bar. Even after Summers the Court reiterated on several occasions
the principle that control of the bar was a matter for the states.
The strongest expression of this was in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar 60 where the Court found that the state had a "compelling in-
terest" in regulating the legal profession because attorneys are es-
sential to the administration of justice, which is itself a primary
function of government. This broad statement was repeated in In
re Primus"' and in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association."6 2 In
many of its other opinions the Court has expressed a similar view,
but in less emphatic terms. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examin-
erses the Court said that a state can impose requirements upon
applicants relating to good moral character and professional quali-
fication. This statement has been repeated in a number of opin-
ions, including Baird v. State Bar of Arizona"" and Law Students
Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond.1 65
As often as the Supreme Court has affirmed state control over
the bar, it has repeated and emphasized the limitation first stated
in In re Summers,6 6 that the exercise of that power is subject to
restrictions by federal constitutional and statutory law. In
157. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). See notes 13-17 and accompanying text supra.
158. 154 U.S. 116 (1894). See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
159. 325 U.S. 561 (1945). See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
160. 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). See notes 115-22 and accompanying text supra. The
Court did make an even stronger statement in Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957),
but that case did not directly involve state regulation of the legal profession hut rather
control by the federal courts over attorneys practicing in those courts. See the quotation at
note 156, supra. In any event, Theard reflects a philosophy that is no longer accepted on the
Supreme Court.
161. 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). See notes 127-32 and accompanying text supra.
162. 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978). See notes 137-49 and accompanying text supra.
163. 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
164. 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971). See notes 39-48 and accompanying text supra.
165. 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971). See notes 54-61 and accompanying text supra.
166. 325 U.S. at 571. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
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Schware, the Court outlined these restrictions: a state cannot deny
admission to the bar in a manner or for reasons that violate the
Fourteenth Amendment; the qualifications imposed by a state
must bear a rational relationship to the applicant's capacity to
practice law; and a state cannot act in an arbitrary or discrimina-
tory manner in bar matters.6 7 The "rational relationship" test was
used in In re Griffiths.6 8 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California169
repeated the third principle and, in addition, said that a state can-
not exercise its regulatory power in such a way as to impinge on
First Amendment freedoms. In NAACP v. Button 7 0 the Court
held that the state may not ignore or violate constitutional rights
in a bar regulatory matter.
Spevack v. Klein,'7 1 Willner v. Committee on Character and
Fitness12 and In re Ruffalo 7 8 found the Fifth Amendment appli-
cable in bar regulatory proceedings.
Sperry v. Florida17 4 and Goldfarb applied the supremacy
clause to bar regulatory matters, stating that rights granted by fed-
eral law cannot be infringed in the name of regulation of the bar.
Goldfarb and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona'7 5 also, however, sup-
port the application of any state action exemption to federal law
when the action is taken by a body exercising the state's regulatory
power. Bar associations, even those in which membership is re-
quired by state law, do not qualify for the state action exemption
unless they are carrying on an activity mandated or approved by a
state body such as a legislature or state supreme court.
The Supreme Court uses a balancing approach in this area,
similar to that used in many other areas of conflict between com-
peting rights or different constitutional provisions. 7' The Court
recognizes the legitimate interest of the state in regulating the bar,
but this interest cannot supersede federal constitutional and statu-
tory rights. The Court's opinions lead to the conclusion that state
167. 353 U.S. at 238-39.
168. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
169. 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957). See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
170. 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963). See notes 104-07 and accompanying text supra.
171. 385 U.S. 511 (1967). See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
172. 373 U.S. 96 (1963). See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
173. 390 U.S. 544 (1968). See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra.
174. 373 U.S. 379 (1963). See notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra.
175. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See notes 123-26 and accompanying text supra.
176. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718-22 (1978).
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activity in regulating the bar stands on no higher a level than the
state's exercise of any of its other governmental powers and is to
be judged by the same standards as any other governmental action.
The best example of this is found in the two in-person solicitation
cases, Primus and Ohralik, in which the Court examined the type
of activity involved, characterized one as a form of political expres-
sion and the other as essentially commercial activity, weighed the
value of the speech against the interests that the state sought to
protect, and found a ban on political expression invalid, while up-
holding the ban on commercial speech.
Those concerned with regulation of the bar apparently assume
that, because of the traditional role of the state in this area, the
classic characterization of the practice of law as a privilege and not
a right, and the once traditional reluctance of the Supreme Court
to interefere with that role, bar regulatory action has a tacit ex-
emption from federal court oversight. Though that view may have
been correct a half century ago, it certainly has not been valid
since the late 1950's. The running debate between Justices Black
and Harlan, as reflected in the cases decided between 1957 and
1970, is no longer relevant except for historical purposes. There is
no apparent disposition on the part of any member of the present
Court (except perhaps Justice Rehnquist) to defer to the states in
regulating the bar. States can no longer assume that their regula-
tory actions are presumptively correct or entitled to any special
deference. This policy applies whether the state action is directed
at admission, discipline, post-admission activities, or solicitation
by attorneys and non-attorneys.
B. Procedure
Procedural problems have caused difficulty in some cases
brought before the Supreme Court, and have been the principal
issue in several other cases. The lack of a clearly defined procedure
for raising and resolving issues of a person's qualifications for ad-
mission to the bar, particularly those involving moral character,
has made it difficult for the Court to ascertain the timeliness of
raising federal issues or the propriety of their disposal at the state
level. From the first admission case, Bradwell, to the most recent,
Griffiths,1 7 review in the Supreme Court has been complicated by
177. See generally notes 10-66 and accompanying text supra.
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the lack of a clear record and confusion over the roles of bar asso-
ciation committees, bar examiner groups, local courts, appellate
courts and a state's highest court. In Bradwell, two justices of the
Illinois Supreme Court, upon a certificate of the applicants' moral
character issued by a county court, granted licenses to practice law.
There were no standards for granting or denying the certificate in
any statute or rule, and there existed no procedure in a statute or
rule for seeking the certificates or for challenging their denial by
hearing or otherwise. In Willner the applicant was not advised of
the reasons for the denial of admission and, thus, had no opportu-
nity to refute the evidence against him. When the bar committee
reported to the state court, the denial was accepted, again with no
procedure for Willner to rebut the disparaging evidence.
Griffiths demonstrates an even more irrational procedure.
There, the application, filed with the clerk of the trial court, was
referred to a committee of the county bar association. Its recom-
mendation that Griffiths' application be denied because she was an
alien was then submitted to a general meeting of the county bar
association which voted to accept the report of the committee. The
matter would have ended there had not Ms. Griffiths taken the
initiative of instituting an action in the superior court for a decree
permitting her to take the bar examination. Only then were the
legal issues involved presented to the body controlling
admissions.17 8
When an application for admission to the bar is thought to be
defective for some reason, the applicant should not be required to
file suit to bring the validity of the application before the court
that has control over the admissions. If the initial body reviewing
the application has dispositive authority, then there should be a
simple procedure for an appeal to the court with jurisdiction over
admissions. If the initial body only serves in an advisory capacity,
then there should be a means for the applicant to respond to the
recommendation prior to action being taken on it. Under no cir-
cumstances should an application be subject to a vote at a general
meeting of a county bar association. Personal, professional and
moral qualifications are not appropriate issues for an exercise in
democracy.
Willner has established the minimum constitutional require-
178. Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 294 A.2d 281 (1972).
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ments for an admissions procedure-the right to be informed of
and to have a hearing on the possible grounds of rejection. Argua-
bly the case also supports a requirement of the right of confronta-
tion and cross-examination if the evidence against the applicant
came from individuals. Willner appears to require only one eviden-
tiary hearing. If the hearing body only makes a recommendation to
a higher body, it is unclear whether there is a right either to an
oral presentation or to submit written views to the latter body.
Given the restrictions on oral argument in appellate courts today
and the many types of proceedings in which there is a right to an
oral presentation only before an advisory person or body, it does
not appear likely that a right to an oral presentation before a state
supreme court on a bar admission proceeding would be allowed.
Possibly, due process would still be satisfied if there were no provi-
sion for submitting written memoranda to the ultimate authority,
provided that the applicant had a full opportunity to present his
arguments at an earlier hearing. Notwithstanding this, the better
procedure would be to allow all concerned parties to file memo-
randa with the determinative body, to give both the benefit of
their views and the appearance of fairness.
The lack of formalized procedure in the discipline process
causes less severe difficulties, probably due to the difference in the
purpose of the process. The admission procedure is designed to
handle the large majority of cases that do not involve major
problems. The discipline procedure exists only for the purpose of
dealing with an allegation of misconduct. Necessarily built into the
discipline process is a procedure for the filing and answering of
charges, an evidentiary hearing before a tribunal, a decision on the
merits and an appeal. A record is made and federal issues can be
raised and decided in the state proceeding. Therefore few disci-
pline cases raise procedural issues identifying, arguing and decid-
ing federal issues.
Of the three discipline cases decided on the merits by the Su-
preme Court, only one, Ruffalo, dealt expressly with procedural
due process. It established the following principles: first, that an
attorney in a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to the due process
requirements of notice and the opportunity to be heard; second,
that the disciplinary proceeding is adversary and quasi-criminal in
nature; and third, that the charges must be known before the pro-
ceeding begins and cannot be subsequently amended on the basis
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of testimony given in the proceeding."' 9
Spevack, while deciding only that refusal to testify in a disci-
plinary proceeding by itself does not constitute grounds for disbar-
ment, also raises the related procedural due process question of
whether an attorney can be compelled to testify in a disciplinary
proceeding. Under Cohen, the two questions were not answered in
the same manner; under Spevack they were. Spevack thus stands
for the principle that an attorney cannot be compelled to testify in
a disciplinary proceeding after invoking the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Unfortunately these principles raise more questions than they
answer. While there is not much difficulty with the requirements of
notice and an opportunity to be heard, the effect of classifying a
disciplinary proceeding as adversary and quasi-criminal in nature
is unclear. Justice Douglas cited In re Gaulti80 in support of his
statement that the disciplinary proceeding was adversary and
quasi-criminal. Gault involved a juvenile court proceeding on a pe-
tition for a determination of delinquency. The Court stated that
such a proceeding need not conform with all of the requirements,
of a criminal trial or even the usual administrative hearing. It did,
however, hold that "notice, to comply with due process require-
ments must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court
proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be af-
forded, and it must 'set forth the alleged misconduct with particu-
larity.' "181 Ruffalo is simply a refinement of this rule as it relates
to amendment of charges on the basis of evidence given at a hear-
ing on the original complaint.
Gault also held that where imprisonment is a possibility, there
is a right to counsel or the right to have counsel appointed if the
defendant is indigent. 182 Disbarment proceedings would not in-
volve the possibility of imprisonment and thus Gault, viewed nar-
rowly, would not mandate counsel in a disciplinary action. How-
ever, such a proceeding could result in the loss of many valuable
rights, substantially affecting a person's reputation. Thus, there
may be some basis for extending Gault to disciplinary proceedings.
179. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra.
180. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
181. Id. at 33.
182. Id. at 41.
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In summary, Spevack and Ruffalo appear to establish that an
attorney subject to a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to procedu-
ral due process that includes advance notice of the details of the
charges, prohibition against amendments made after testimony is
taken and, when evidence given by a witness is disputed, confron-
tation and cross-examination. Although not expressly held, it is
likely that there is a right to be represented by counsel in a disci-
plinary proceeding because of its quasi-criminal nature as ex-
pressed in Ruffalo. Whether the state is required to provide coun-
sel to an indigent defendant in a disciplinary proceeding is still an
open question.8 s
In an effort to develop a model procedure for discipline cases,
the American Bar Association has developed Standards for Lawyer
Disciplinary and Disability Proceedings.18" These standards com-
ply with all of the Supreme Court cases to date and go beyond
them in many areas.185 Consequently, they can be safely used by a
state in revising its discipline procedure.
There is far less guidance, however, in developing an admis-
sions procedure. As previously noted, Willner imposes only mini-
mal due process requirements.18 6 No organization such as the
American Bar Association has had a representative group review
the entire matter and propose procedural standards similar to
those relating to the discipline process. The National Conference
of Bar Examiners has developed a model rule, but the committee
that drafted it consisted almost exclusively of bar admission au-
thorities and thus cannot be considered a group representative of a
variety of interests.1 87
A model rule should be clear as to the person or body respon-
183. For a discussion of a closely related problem, see Cohn, The Limited Due Process
Rights of Judges in Disciplinary Proceedings, 63 JUDIcATuRE 232 (1979).
184. ABA, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (1979).
185. An area in which the standards follow, but do not go beyond due process require-
ments as established by the Supreme Court, is in combining prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions in a single body. This is permitted by Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). The
combination of functions appears unwise, because of the possibility of injustice arising out
of the same body performing essentially conflicting functions and because of the appearance
of unfairness. For a comprehensive attack on a state's disciplinary procedure that was rebuf-
fed on abstention grounds, see Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
186. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
187. National Conference of Bar Examiners, Proposed Model Code of Rules for Ad-
mission to the Practice of Law, 40 BAR EXAMINER 129 (1971).
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sible for each step in the admission process, how an application is
taken from one step to the next, and who is responsible for moving
the application through each step in the process. Without this, an
application may not be acted upon in a timely manner. It must
also clearly state that those who act for the admitting authority are
doing so as an arm of that authority and not as a representative of
a bar association. This will reduce the possibility that the denial of
an application is based more upon a desire to reduce competition
than upon the merits. The rules should also state whether and by
whom any of the requirements can be waived, and, if one exists,
the procedure for seeking a waiver.
The admissions procedure should require formal orders and
opinions which can serve as the basis for review at a higher level.
This is particularly important when a dispute reaches the state su-
preme court and federal constitutional issues are involved. Seeking
review in the United States Supreme Court when there is no for-
mal order and no statement of the reasons for denial causes diffi-
culty for both the applicant and the Court.
The rules should also reflect the actual requirements imposed
upon applicants. No state should defend an admission rule with
the argument that the rule does not really mean what it says. This
was the situation in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
where New York argued that a requirement that an applicant fur-
nish proof that he "believes in the form of government of the
United States and is loyal to such government" meant only that
the applicant had to be willing to take an oath to support the Con-
stitution.188 If that was all that New York required, the rules
should have so stated.
C. Qualifications for Admission to the Bar
As previously noted in Section II A189 the Supreme Court has
subjected state requirements for admission to the bar to two gen-
eral limitations: they must be reasonably related to the practice of
law and they must not violate an applicant's federal constitutional
rights. Each Supreme Court opinion also approves or disapproves a
specific qualification imposed by a state. For example, a state can
require an applicant to take an oath to support the state and fed-
188. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 10-76 and accompanying text supra.
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eral constitutions.19 A state can also, the Summers court ruled,
exclude an applicant who refuses to pledge to serve in the state
militia.191 This decision relied on prior cases, since overruled, per-
mitting the United States to deny citizenship to persons who did
not promise to serve in the armed forces, 9 2 and is thus probably
no longer good law.
A state can establish a screening process for applicants and
require them to respond to questions concerning their qualifica-
tions to practice law.193
A state cannot, however, ask an applicant to list all of the or-
ganizations to which he has belonged. 9 While it can ask about
membership in an organization that advocates violent overthrow of
the government, it may do so only if the question is limited to
knowing membership by one who has the specific intent to further
the organization's goals.1 9 5 A state can ask about membership in
the Communist Party as a preliminary to further inquiry about the
nature of the affiliation.196
No issue has caused greater disagreement on the Court than
the authority of a state to deny admission to an applicant who re-
fuses to answer questions about membership in an organization
that advocates violent overthrow of the government. The Court has
vacillated on the issue, depending on which position is able to gar-
ner enough concurrences to prevail in a specific case. Since the
most recent cases were decided in 1971,197 the rules have not
changed for nine years and are now accepted as the controlling
principles.
Under these cases, an applicant who refuses to answer a ques-
tion which the state is permitted to ask can be denied admission.
190. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
See also notes 54-61 and accompanying text supra.
191. See note 21 and cases cited therein supra.
192. Gerouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
193. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
194. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
195. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165
(1971).
196. Id. at 165-66. The difficulty in attempting to reconcile Baird v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 401 U.S. 1, In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 and Law Students Civil Rights Research Council
v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, all decided on February 23, 1971, is commented upon in Note,
Bar Admission Procedures: Inquiry into Political Beliefs and Associations, 22 DEPAUL L.
R-v. 524 (1972).
197. See note 196 and cases cited therein supra.
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It must be clear that the questions are not directed only at the
discovery of beliefs but at the likelihood of the applicant to act in
a manner inconsistent with proper conduct of an attorney. It must
also be clear that an answer to the question will not by itself result
in the denial of admission, but will lead only to a further investiga-
tion of matters that are legitimate subjects of inquiry. It is also
necessary that the applicant be warned of the consequences of his
refusal to answer. 198
The Court has held that a state may not deny admission solely
on grounds of citizenship. In Griffiths, the Court found that the
state had not shown a sufficient relationship between citizenship
and the practice of law to justify the requirement. Later in
Ambach v. Norwick 99 the Court held that a state could bar resi-
dent aliens from teaching public school. The Court found that
teaching in public schools was a governmental function and distin-
guished Griffiths on this basis. A similar result might be obtained
in cases involving bar admission if the relationship between a law-
yer and the function of the courts was emphasized. This relation-
ship is the basis for the courts' holding that regulation of the bar is
a part of the judicial, rather than legislative, power, and thus, it
may be accepted by the Supreme Court as the basis for a different
result than Griffiths.
Although some issues concerning bar admission appear to be
settled, there are many aspects of the process which have not been
subjected to Supreme Court scrutiny. These include residency2 00
and age requirements, permitting some persons to be admitted on
the diploma privilege while requiring others to take a bar examina-
tion2 01 permitting some but not all out-of-state attorneys to be ad-
mitted on motion, 02 the potential conflict of interest in having at-
198. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
199. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
200. See, e.g., Gordon v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 48 N.Y. 2d 266, 397
N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979). See Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar
Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1461 (1979). See also Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 614 F.2d
943 (4th Cir. 1980)(challenge to Maryland's former residency requirement dismissed as
moot).
201. In Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175 (D. Mont. 1974), a
three judge district court upheld, in a 2-1 decision, Montana's statute permitting graduates
of the University of Montana School of Law to be admitted in that state without taking a
bar examination.
202. O'Neal v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1977), rejected a challenge to a bar
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torneys and bar associations involved in the admission process,2° 3
the requirement of graduation from an American Bar Association
accredited law school,2° the development and grading of the bar
examination,05 individual questions on the application form206 in
the character investigation, the use of the multi-state bar examina-
tion, waiver of requirements, disparity in bar examination failure
rates between racial or sexual groups,207 and grounds for auto-
matic disqualifications such as felony convictions. Many of these
issues have already been presented to lower federal courts and thus
may come before the Supreme Court in the near future.
In considering the outcome* of these questions, one must real-
ize that the Supreme Court no longer gives any presumption of
validity to a state's actions concerning admission to the practice of
law. Rather, admission to the bar will be treated on the same basis
as the granting or denying by government of any benefit or privi-
lege20 8 -that is, admission qualifications must be rationally related
to a person's capacity or fitness to practice law and must not be
used to violate constitutional rights.20 9
To insure that the qualifications imposed by a state are ration-
ally related to the practice of law, each state should review all of
its requirements, applying the test to each. In so doing, the state
should not assume that, because something has traditionally been
required, it necessarily bears any substantial relationship to the
practice of law. One way to avoid the trap of treating the tradi-
tional as necessary is to approach the subject as though there are
no requirements, imposing entirely new ones. When a new list of
requirements is developed, it can be compared with the existing
examination requirement for non-resident attorneys moving to Nevada, citing Gormley v.
Committee on Admissions, 419 U.S. 810 (1974), which the Supreme Court dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question.
203. Justice Black referred to this problem in his dissenting opinion in Law Students
Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
.204. See, e.g., Potter v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 403 F. Supp. 1036 (D. N.J. 1975),
aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976).
205. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
206. A prime candidate for challenge is the question asked by North Carolina: "[A]re
you married and living with your spouse? If not, why not?" Is There a Need for Uniformity
in Application Forms and Fitness Questions? A Panel Discussion, 47 BAR EXAMINER 36, 39
(1978).
207. See, e.g., Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975).
208. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971).
209. See notes 167-68 and cases cited therein supra.
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ones to determine if any essential qualification has been
overlooked.
Residency qualifications provide an example of the type of
analysis which should be made. Residency of various lengths is re-
quired in most, but not all states.210 Is residency really necessary?
One argument is that it is essential to enable a state to exercise
control of the members of its bar. This argument loses effect, how-
ever, because an attorney who is a resident when admitted can
leave the state permanently thereafter and still continue to prac-
tice in that state. To avoid the problem of admitting persons who
have no intention of practicing in the state, a requirement could be
drawn that an applicant demonstrate some intent to practice in
the state on either a full or part-time basis. Residency, by itself,
does not appear to have any rational relationship to bar admission
and thus should not be required.2 11
One aspect of the admissions process that appears to be safe
from further Supreme Court review is the restriction on out-of-
state attorneys. Martin v. Walton212 and Leis v. Flynt2ls permit a
state to ban completely non-resident attorneys from appearing pro
hac vice in its courts or to put conditions upon their appearance.
Even when permitted in the discretion of a judge, no hearing is
required and thus the exercise of the discretion is unreviewable in
the federal courts. Why a state would establish such a procedure
may be a question that is difficult to answer, but insofar as the
Supreme Court is concerned, it is a state and not a federal issue.
States also appear to be free to impose whatever conditions they
think desirable upon a non-resident attorney who is admitted per-
manently to its bar. 4 It is unlikely, however, that a state could
impose a condition that would violate recognized constitutional
rights.
210. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (West 1979); Note, A Constitutional Analysis
of State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 200.
211. The residency requirement is already under attack in lower courts and it seems
only a matter of time before the question reaches the Supreme Court. Note, A Constitu-
tional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 200.
212. 368 U.S. 25 (1961). See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
213. 439 U.S. 438 (1979). See notes 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
214. See note 76 and the cases cited therein supra.
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D. The Practice of Law
Once a person is admitted to the practice of law, state control
over his conduct is substantial. This control arises primarily from
the code of professional responsibility that is in effect in the state,
and requirements set forth in state statutes, court rules, and court
opinions. Only a few of these regulations have been reviewed by
the Supreme Court.
Lathrop v. Donohue2 15 is usually cited as authority for the
constitutional requirement that an attorney belong and pay dues
to a state bar association. The plurality opinion in that case was
more limited, however, dealing only with the issue of paying dues
to a state bar organization that may spend funds for legislative ac-
tivities to which an attorney may object. The attorney in that case
did not allege the expenditure of any specific funds on a particular
item of legislation to which he was opposed, and thus the merits of
the constitutional requirement were not reached. The Supreme
Court has given Lathrop just that reading in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education.216 There the Court held that public teachers
cannot be compelled by the state to support political activity by a
union to which they are required to belong. This case could be read
as requiring similar protection for attorneys who are compelled to
belong to a state bar. There are, however, several differences. In
Abood, the union supported political candidates, not issues, and
legislative activity was not within the statutory responsibilities of
the collective bargaining agent. In Lathrop the state bar took posi-
tions only on legislation, not candidates, and one of the functions
of the state bar as authorized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was to support improvements in the administration of justice,
some of which could be accomplished only by legislation. Notwith-
standing these differences, the use of the dues of a mandatory state
bar for legislative activity appears to violate the basic principle of
Abood. Abood also holds that it is not incumbent upon the individ-
ual to detail the disputed actions taken by the organization nor to
prove how much was spent on them. The Supreme Court stated
that it favors an internal voluntary plan whereby objectors to legis-
lative activity can obtain a refund of that portion of the dues spent
for political purposes, and a reduction of future dues assessments
215. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). See notes 91-97 and accompanying text supra.
216. 431 U.S. 209, 233 n.29 (1977).
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to exclude that portion attributable to political activity. It would
appear incumbent upon mandatory state bar organizations to
adopt such a procedure.
The conduct of an attorney in connection with court proceed-
ings on behalf of a client is regulated by a state's code of profes-
sional responsibility, standards governing courtroom conduct such
as the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Ad-
ministration of Criminal Justice, 17 and statutes, rules, or court de-
cisions defining contempt of court. Holt v. Virginia"'8 prohibits the
use of any of these regulations in such a way as to prevent an at-
torney from adequately representing his client. The opinion does
suggest, however, that an attorney is not immune from charges of
professional misconduct simply because he has engaged in im-
proper conduct while acting as an attorney. The interest being pro-
tected is the client's, not the attorney's, right to due process. The
test for determining whether a state can regulate or prohibit a par-
ticular activity will, consequently, be whether the regulation or
prohibition will deny due process to the person being represented
by the attorney.
The recent cases decided by the Supreme Court have been
concerned with state efforts to limit or prohibit activity by attor-
neys or others designed to generate legal business or to attract it to
one attorney or another. The prohibition against this type of activ-
ity has an ancient and honorable tradition,219 and the Supreme
Court in Goldfarb has acknowledged the power of the state to re-
strict some forms of competition to protect the ethical standards of
the legal profession.220 There are, however, severe limitations upon
the states in enforcing these restrictions. Bar association activities
which* go beyond those of the state may violate federal statutes en-
couraging competition, such as the Sherman Act.2 2 1 State activity
is also subject to federal statutory control222 and Sperry enforced
217. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Compi-
lation (1974).
218. 381 U.S. 131 (1965). See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
219. See McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107, 108 (1920). See generally Comment, A
Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 674
(1958).
220. 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1975).
221. Id.
222. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). See notes 98-100 and accompanying text
supra.
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such a restriction. But even when exempted from the federal stat-
ute, the state activity must not interfere with the constitutional
rights of individuals, organizations, or attorneys.22 3
The response of the bar has been more positive than some
might have been expected. Minimum fee schedules, even of an ad-
visory nature, have disappeared. Restrictions on advertising, other
than prohibiting that which is false or misleading, have been elimi-
nated in some states224 and are likely to be abandoned entirely.2 25
Perhaps the largest unexplored area involves the most basic
issue-what constitutes the practice of law. States have made
many efforts to prohibit the unauthorized practice of law.22e To
date, the Supreme Court has not been faced with a case involving a
definition of the practice of law, but it is only a matter of time
before this occurs. Such a case could arise through a challenge to
agreements between the legal profession and other professions as
duties supposedly unique to a lawyer.2 27 It could also arise in the
context of the activities of paralegals, representatives of corpora-
tions, particularly those of a non-profit character, or publication of
books giving legal advice.22
Here again, results in specific cases cannot be predicted with
certainty. What can be predicted, however, is the approach that
will be taken by the Supreme Court. The Court will look at the
harm that the state is trying to protect against by prohibiting non-
attorneys from engaging in the conduct, weighed against the harm
suffered by the non-attorney in not being able to engage in the
activity. The harm to the public will have to be greater when a
First Amendment right is involved. An important factor is whether
the public interest alleged to be the object of the regulation is sim-
ply a cover for protection of the economic interests of the legal
223. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977); United Transp. Union v. Michigan State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
224. See, e.g., Wisconsin's Code of Professional Responsibility, Wis. STAT. ch. 757
(1977).
225. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, Rules 9.1-9.3 (Jan. 1980 Draft).
226. See L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 364-76 (1971).
227. Id. at 366.
228. Morrison, Revising the Definition of the Practice of Law as a Way of Increasing
the Availability of Legal Services, 66 A.B.A.J. 248 (1980).
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profession. An example of this conffict would be an attack on a rule
that restricts an attorney from identifying himself as a specialist in
a particular area of the law. The precise type of restriction will be
important, as will be the evidence presented to demonstrate an ac-
tual or probable injury to the public. Defenders of the restriction
will have to do more than simply provide a list of potential but
unproven dangers to the public. Also relevant will be whether the
case arises in the context of an organization attempting to aid its
members or simply an attorney who wants to advertise a specialty
without any demonstrated competence in the field. State efforts to
regulate group legal plans may provide additional opportunities for
the Supreme Court to weigh the public interest in access to legal
services against traditional limitations upon the provision of those
services.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the change in the Court's
philosophy toward state regulation of the bar is found in its most
recent decision, Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers
Union.2 29 The liability of those responsible for regulation of the
bar to be sued for injunctive relief or for damages is to be decided
upon the same principles applicable to other state officials in any
other area of governmental activity. Under these principles en-
forcement officials are liable to suit and to payment of attorney's
fees, but those responsible for rulemaking and adjudication are im-
mune from both. This raises problems for bar regulatory authori-
ties. To the extent that courts have the ability to initiate or direct
the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an attorney to en-
force a rule or regulation, they are liable to suit, may have injunc-
tive relief issued against them, and may be required to pay attor-
ney's fees in cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For those
involved in bar discipline, whether with a bar or court agency, the
same liability exists. Persons or agencies which have both
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are liable for the former
activity but not the latter.
The applicability of Consumers Union to the admission pro-
cess is more difficult. Are admission authorities acting only in an
adjudicative capacity because they merely respond to petitions for
admission, or are they enforcement agencies seeking compliance
with the rules and regulations governing admission to the bar?
229. 444 U.S. 914 (1980). See notes 143-49 and accompanying text supra.
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There is no simple answer to this question. It will depend upon
how the issue arises. The denial of an admission made on the basis
of a simple failure to comply with a formal requirement and which
does not involve a hearing or adjudication which would render
those enforcing the rule subject to suit and liability for attorney's
fees. If, however, there is a factual dispute requiring a hearing,
those holding the hearing and making the adjudication would be
immune from any type of legal action. This would apply to deter-
minations of moral character as well as other more objective issues.
Conclusion
Control over the legal profession for most of the history of the
republic was considered to be the exclusive province of the states.
The first cases attacking some aspect of this control as violating
federal rights did not reach the United States Supreme Court until
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Not until 1945 did the
Supreme Court acknowledge that the Fourteenth Amendment ap-
plied to regulation of the bar. In 1957 the Court for the first time
held that a state action in a bar regulatory matter violated a fed-
eral constitutional right. Since then, the Court has been presented
with challenges to state actions or regulations concerning admis-
sion to the bar, discipline of attorneys, procedural due process in
admission and discipline matters, solicitation by attorneys and
non-attorneys, relationship between attorneys and non-attorneys,
bar membership requirements, fee schedules, practice by non-resi-
dent attorneys, governance of practice before federal agencies, and
the courtroom conduct of attorneys. In all of these areas the defer-
ence once granted to state action no longer exists, even though the
Court continues to acknowledge the primary interest of the states
in regulating the bar. The Court has adopted several general prin-
ciples in this area. A requirement for admission to the bar must
bear a rational relationship to an applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law. The Court will review a restriction on attorneys or
other persons based upon the power to regulate the practice of law
by weighing the state's interests against the harm suffered by the
person upon whom the restriction is imposed. Regulations limiting
activities protected by the First Amendment must meet a higher
standard than those restricting other types of activities. Notwith-
standing the special interest of the states, the Supreme Court no
longer gives a presumption of validity to the action of a state in
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regulating its legal profession. A state's effort to control the bar.
will now be judged on the same basis as any other exercise of state
authority.
This change in philosophy on the part of the Court has impor-
tant implications not only for the state courts and related agencies
who exercise direct authority over attorneys, but also for bar as-
sociations-state and local, mandatory and voluntary-individual
attorneys, organizations seeking to assist their members in assert-
ing public or private rights, consumers of legal services, and the
public at large. State regulatory bodies and bar associations should
examine critically all present rules and regulations which control
the practice of law to determine whether each rule or regulation is
necessary to protect the public or is based simply on tradition or
on the desire to protect the economic interests of present members
of the legal profession. This review should be made by representa-
tives not only of the regulatory agencies and the legal profession
but also by members of the public. If this is done, the likelihood
that the Supreme Court will be forced to intervene in the state's
control of the legal profession to protect the public will be substan-
tially reduced. Both the public and the bar will be the
beneficiaries.
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